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PREDICTION MARKETS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Miriam A. Cherry* 
Robert L. Rogers** 
The continuing development of prediction markets is important 
because of their success in foretelling the future in politics, economics, 
and science.  In this article, we identify the expressive elements inher-
ent in prediction markets and explore how legislation such as the 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 might harm 
such predictive speech.  This article is the first to explore First 
Amendment protections for prediction markets in such depth, and in 
so doing, we distinguish prediction markets from other regulated ar-
eas such as gambling, commodities, and securities trading.  The arti-
cle’s examination of prediction markets also illustrates the limitations 
of current commercial speech doctrine.  We conclude by discussing 
how the executive, legislative, and judicial branches might resolve the 
First Amendment challenges of regulating prediction markets, and we 
propose a new legal test, modeled on existing free speech jurispru-
dence, which may assist courts in adjudicating any constitutional 
challenges. 
Thine oracle, in vain to be, 
Oh wherefore am I thus consign’d, 
With eyes that every truth must see, 
Lone in the City of the Blind?1 
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Law School.  We wish to acknowledge Michael Abramowicz, Brannon P. Denning, Susan Franck, 
Franklin Gevurtz, Robin Hanson, Amy Landers, Peter Linzer, Angela Onwauchi-Willig, William G. 
Ross, Joshua Smith, and John Sprankling for their helpful comments.  Thanks to the faculties of Uni-
versity of the Pacific-McGeorge School of Law, the University of Alabama Law School, and Florida 
State University College of Law for providing feedback on some of the thoughts set forth in this piece.  
We would also like to thank the editors at the University of Illinois Law Review. 
 1. JOHAN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, Cassandra, in THE POEMS AND BALLADS OF 
SCHILLER 98, 100 (Lord Lytton Edwards trans., 1887). 
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In 2006, Congress passed The Unlawful Internet Gambling En-
forcement Act, aimed at ending Internet gambling.2  Although perhaps 
not its intent, the bill creates further legal uncertainty for prediction 
markets, an emerging technology that allows thousands of people to join 
together to make predictions about the future in a market-based setting.  
These prediction markets, unlike many other economic activities, contain 
important elements of speech and expression and therefore should be ac-
corded substantial First Amendment protection.  This article explores 
the interplay between this emerging technology, the First Amendment, 
and the recent gambling legislation.  The article also discusses how many 
traditional models of regulation, including the regimes governing gam-
bling, securities law, and commodities trading, fit poorly with this new 
form of collaborative information gathering.  Taken as a whole, this arti-
cle’s examination of prediction markets also helps to shed light on the 
limitations of current commercial speech doctrine.  To overcome the 
clash between the First Amendment and regulatory efforts, this article 
provides specific recommendations regarding the ways in which the Ex-
ecutive Branch, Congress, and the courts can help resolve the conflict be-
tween the First Amendment and restrictions on prediction markets, in-
cluding a proposal for a judicial test modeled on existing First 
Amendment principles. 
Although gambling websites were  prevented from operating in the 
United States under the Department of Justice’s interpretation of the 
Wire Act before the October 2006 legislation,3 many companies had side-
stepped this interpretation by relocating their businesses offshore.  The 
October 2006 legislation foreclosed that option by preventing credit card 
companies from making payments to gambling websites, regardless of 
their location.4  Although analysts certainly can debate the merits of this 
recent crackdown5—perhaps designed as an appeal to the religious right 
 
 2. Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 802, 120 Stat. 
1884, 1952 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 53 (West Supp. 2007)).  The provisions regarding internet 
gambling were tacked on to a bill that primarily dealt with the issue of port safety.  For a brief prelimi-
nary discussion of the contents of the bill, see I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537 (2006). 
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Pri-
vate Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 371, 414 (2006). 
 4. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5364 (West Supp. 2006).  In an action that has received surprisingly little law 
review commentary, Antigua is currently fighting the United States in the WTO on the effect of the 
internet gambling ban.  See Kelly A. Tran, The WTO Appellate Body Gambles on the Future of the 
GATS: Analyzing the Internet Gambling Dispute Between Antigua and the United States Before the 
World Trade Organization, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 165, 165–66 (2006). 
 5. In this article, our focus is the effect of the internet gambling ban on prediction markets.  
Whether the decision to ban certain forms of gambling is a wise policy choice is beyond the scope of 
this article.  At the same time, we do note the concern that money that once went to online casinos 
may ultimately support organized crime.  See Peter Sanders, Why the Local Bookie Could Be a Big 
Winner in 2007 Super Bowl, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2007, at B1 (noting that government crackdown is 
not eliminating gambling, just driving it underground).  In addition, it is important to realize that cur-
rently, our system of regulating gambling itself is a patchwork, including jurisdictions that allow all 
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before the November 2006 congressional elections6—the fact is that this 
legislation has far-reaching consequences in ways that Congress probably 
did not intend.7  One of those unintended consequences may be the inhi-
bition of prediction markets. 
Prediction markets, also known as information markets or idea fu-
tures,8 are a relatively new technology that allows many individuals to 
express their opinions in a market setting.  By letting people put “their 
money where their mouth is,” information markets encourage thousands 
of people to join together in cyberspace to predict future events.9  These 
markets are more than games of chance or entertainment, given that they 
draw on the unique information, knowledge, and skills that individual 
participants bring with them to the market.10  Prediction markets distill 
participants’ views into a collective wisdom and in so doing, advance 
utilitarian goals, creating social welfare and monetary value that go be-
yond the amounts invested in the markets.  Prediction markets are not 
subject to many of the ills traditionally associated with gambling, given 
the lack of involvement by organized crime, the small monetary sums in-
volved, and the minimal risk of addiction.11  Yet, in the congressional zeal 
to stamp out Internet gambling, information markets are in danger of be-
ing trampled. 
Because of the expressive element inherent in prediction markets, 
we contend that one’s participation in such a market is often entitled to 
First Amendment protection.  Each person who participates in an infor-
mation market is, in essence, offering his or her opinion on the outcome 
of an uncertain future event.  A survey of the markets currently operat-
ing shows that they have tended to cluster in certain areas, predicting po-
litical events, current events, as well as developments in entertainment, 
 
sorts of gambling, those that forbid gambling, and those that engage in state-sponsored gambling in 
the form of lotteries.  See generally Frederick Preston et al., Gambling as Stigmatized Behavior: Re-
gional Relabeling and the Law, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 186 (1998) (discussing dif-
ferent gambling laws across states and time).  Without delving too far into the policy debate, one could 
plausibly argue that the prohibitions against gambling have been fading and that many of those prohi-
bitions may not conform to the stated rationales for them.  See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See, e.g., Anna Palmer, Online-Gambling Interests Lose 10-Year Fight, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2006, at 13 (describing lobbying fight as a “huge victory for social conservative groups”). 
 7. Even after the bill, the furor over internet gambling continues, with the Department of Jus-
tice subpoenaing investment banks that had underwritten the initial public offerings of several over-
seas gambling companies.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Stephanie Saul, Gambling Subpoenas on Wall 
St., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at C1. 
 8. Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 39 nn.18–21 (2006) (listing different terminology used for the markets).  
Although in this article we tend to use “prediction market” and “information market” interchangea-
bly, the term “prediction market” may be less confusing, as “information market” potentially conjures 
the specter of the sale of personal information on the internet or data mining, which, while important 
issues, are wholly unrelated to our project. 
 9. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY 1–8 (forthcoming 2008) (draft on file with 
authors). 
 10. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 103–45 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part III. 
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science, and technology.12  Currently, more than a third of the publicly 
traded information markets work to predict the outcomes of elections 
and newsworthy issues.13  These subjects are all areas of public concern, 
as that term is traditionally used in First Amendment jurisprudence, and 
indeed, many of these subjects involve areas of core political speech.  In 
addition to the speech rights of the individual participants, information 
markets as a whole generate predictions that are a form of “metaspeech” 
that should also be allowed to flourish. 
Although several other commentators have offered preliminary 
identification of the existing regulatory regimes—commodities trading, 
securities regulation, and gambling laws—that might be applied to in-
formation markets,14 there has been little discussion of the interaction of 
prediction markets with the First Amendment.15  Certain characteristics 
of prediction markets, such as their reliance on information, skill, and 
knowledge, make them different from gambling or other games of 
chance, or even from games of mixed skill and chance, such as poker.  
Prediction markets are also different from traditional stock markets, 
which exist for the purpose of raising capital and sharing risk and reward 
among investors.  And certain characteristics of information markets set 
them apart from commodities markets, which are designed to allow enti-
ties to engage in hedging strategies to manage their risk exposure.16 
In Part I, we provide a brief background on the workings of predic-
tion markets and an analysis of how the provisions of the recent Internet 
gambling bill might affect them.  In Part II, we identify some of the ex-
pressive interests at stake in a prediction market, both by the individual 
participant and, intriguingly, by the market itself.  Then, in Part III, we 
address the commodities, securities, and gambling laws—arguably areas 
 
 12. Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Infor-
mation Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339, 351–53, 372–75 (2006) [hereinafter Cherry & Rogers, Mar-
kets for Markets] (surveying topics of prediction markets). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of Markets in Sci-
ence Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 164–77 (2002) [hereinafter Bell, Legality of Markets] (providing 
preliminary discussion of regulatory models); Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Pro-
gress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 59–92 (2006) [hereinafter Bell, Pro-
moting the Progress] (providing overview of regulatory models potentially applicable to scientific pre-
diction markets, and concluding that common law contract and tort remedies would suffice in terms of 
regulation); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating Information Mar-
kets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 269–79 (2006) [hereinafter Hahn & Tetlock, A New Approach] (discussing 
models of regulation and advocating CFTC oversight for such markets); Paul Architzel, Event Markets 
Evolve: Legal Certainty Needed, FUTURES INDUSTRY MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 50, 53, available at 
http://www.futuresindustry.org/fimagazi-1929.asp?a=1106 (advocating for CFTC oversight); Robert 
Hahn & Paul Tetlock, Short Odds for Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at A17 (brief op-ed piece 
persuasively arguing for CFTC regulation).  None of these articles, however, contains more than a 
passing mention of the expressive elements of prediction markets. 
 15. The discussion to date is a brief website post by Robin Hanson.  Professor Hanson is a vi-
sionary in the field of information markets, and on his website he argues that participation in an in-
formation market should be considered expression.  See Robin Hanson, Policy Markets Should Be 
Free Speech, http://hanson.gmu.edu/iffreespeech.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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of law that some might regard as offering models for regulating informa-
tion markets—but also, importantly, discuss the expressive elements that 
distinguish prediction markets from these regulated areas.  In Part IV, 
we discuss two models of First Amendment regulation, expressive con-
duct and commercial speech, that might at first seem to be applicable.  
However, because prediction markets are different from the “usual” 
speech addressed by those doctrines, they call into question the tradi-
tional ways that the commercial speech doctrine has been conceptual-
ized.  Finally, in Part V, we explore how the legal uncertainties surround-
ing information markets could be alleviated—through regulatory, 
statutory, and judicial solutions. 
I. BACKGROUND: A TRUE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s analogy of free speech as “a marketplace 
of ideas” is compelling because it describes an environment in which 
speakers and listeners in search of truth can place value upon and choose 
between competing thoughts.17  Through the technological advances that 
led to information markets, Holmes’s analogy is transformed into a set-
ting where predictions compete in cyberspace, an aggregation of many 
individual ideas and thoughts into a market price that expresses the col-
lective knowledge of the group.18  In this section, we provide a brief back-
ground on how prediction markets work and the various subjects that 
they cover.  In the second section, we discuss the potential impact of the 
recent internet gambling bill on these markets. 
A. How Prediction Markets Work and the Subjects They Cover 
As noted previously, prediction markets organize and aggregate in-
dividual knowledge into a collective result.  Each individual who is a 
trader in the information market acts to maximize his or her own reward.  
At the same time, the organizers of the market organize the results and 
harvest the valuable information that individuals have generated.  In his 
popular book, The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki explains nu-
merous ways in which such collective knowledge can be employed.19  
Whether individuals are asked to estimate the location of a sunken sub-
marine,20 to guess the weight of an ox,21 or to help a contestant on the 
game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire,22 groups provide accurate an-
 
 17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
 18. For a broad overview of free speech rights in cyberspace, see MIKE GODWIN, CYBER 
RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 13–23 (1998) (listing and describing free 
speech rights in the digital age). 
 19. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xiv, 3–4 (2004). 
 20. Id. at xx–xxi. 
 21. Id. at xi–xiii. 
 22. On the television program Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, contestants had to answer trivia 
questions in a multiple-choice format.  Each contestant had several “lifelines” that they could use, in-
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swers to questions that most individuals would not be able to answer on 
their own.  In a prediction market, individuals are given incentives to 
trade and contribute their knowledge in a formalized setting. 
The theory behind prediction markets is loosely related to the 
semistrong version of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which 
holds that, in a properly functioning capital market, the prices of securi-
ties will reflect all relevant publicly available information.23  The price of 
a security on the market encodes a significant amount of information, in-
cluding beliefs about the efficacy of management, the potential for future 
products, or market expansions.24  In other words, most markets have a 
“price discovery” function, aggregating information and predictions into 
the current price of that security.25  In traditional capital markets, how-
ever, the information-seeking aspects are, to a certain degree, by-
products of trading and raising capital.  In contrast, this information 
seeking is the main reason for the prediction market’s existence. 
At present, numerous information markets are successfully making 
predictions.  Among the most notable, especially during the past two 
hotly contested presidential elections, is the Iowa Electronic Markets 
(IEM).26  The IEM, started in 1988 by professors at the University of 
Iowa Business School, has been operating since that time to predict the 
outcomes of various elections.27  An individual trader is limited to a $500 
investment, so although the financial stake of any one person in the out-
come is modest, each still has a financial incentive for making a correct 
prediction.28 
 
cluding narrowing the options, telephoning a friend, and polling the audience.  Although the first two 
options were often helpful, the audience for the television program was the most helpful of all, achiev-
ing a ninety-one percent success rate.  Id. at 3–4; cf. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 723, 734 n.22 (2001) (providing Who Wants to Be a Millionaire poll of the audience as 
illustration of the Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
 23. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552–53 (1984). 
 24. See Fama, supra note 23, at 383. 
 25. See generally Michael T. Chng, A Model of Price Discovery and Market Design: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence, 24 J. FUTURES MARKETS 1107, 1108–10 (2004) (describing price discovery func-
tion performed by derivatives markets). 
 26. See, e.g., Erin Jordan, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result, DES MOINES 
REG., Nov. 10, 2004, at 5B.  The IEM trades at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/. 
 27. Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research 1 (Nov. 
2000), http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf [hereinafter Berg et al., Results]. The 
IEM has also expanded into predictions further afield from its base of political predictions.  Id. at 7 
n.10; Erin Jordan, U of I Markets Tapped to Predict Flu Activity, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 22, 2004, at 
B1. 
 28. See Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets]. 
CHERRY.DOC 3/31/2008  9:45:29 AM 
No. 3] PREDICTION MARKETS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 839 
The IEM has predicted the outcomes of elections more accurately 
than polls have, beating the polls seventy-six percent of the time.29  This 
accuracy occurs despite the fact that researchers at the University of 
Iowa have concluded that many of the market participants exhibit a 
strong bias toward one candidate or other.30  Apparently, the market is 
able to correct for these biases through arbitrage.31  Sensing an opportu-
nity for profit, arbitrageurs temper the ideological biases that some of the 
participants bring with them when they invest in the IEM.32 
Other similar political prediction markets have appeared to predict 
the outcome of elections in Austria,33 Germany,34 and Canada.35  While 
the IEM is run by an educational institution, some election markets are 
run by for-profit companies.  For example, Intrade, a commercial infor-
mation market, correctly predicted the outcome of the 2006 congres-
sional elections with more success than many television analysts.36  In-
trade is currently allowing participants to trade predictions about the 
outcome of the 2008 presidential election.37  In addition to elections, a 
significant number of markets make predictions about current events, in-
cluding politics, news, and the entertainment industry.38 
The scientific community also uses prediction markets to gauge eve-
rything from the progress of stem-cell research to the timetable for the 
availability of human cloning.39  Public health experts, for example, are 
using a real-money information market to predict the likelihood of an 
 
 29. Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets 12–13, 33 
tbl.3 (July 2003), http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf [hereinafter Berg et al., Accu-
racy]. 
 30. Berg et al., Results, supra note 27, at 5.  The average trader is younger, more likely to be a 
white male of a higher socioeconomic status than the average voter.  Berg et al., Accuracy, supra note 
29, at 12. 
 31. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behav-
ioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 140 n.15 (2002) (defining arbitrage as 
the “process by which informed traders buy or sell in such a way as to eliminate any mispricing caused 
by uninformed trading,” so that, for example, “when a stock becomes overvalued because uninformed 
traders are bidding it up, informed traders would sell, hence moving the price back to its rational ex-
pectations equilibrium”). 
 32. Berg, et al., Results, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
 33. Austrian Political Stock Markets / Austrian Electronic Markets,  http://www.imw.tuwien.ac. 
at/apsm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (information markets predicting outcomes of Austrian elections). 
 34. Int’l IT Mktg. Ltd., Financial Times Deutschland State Interactive Online Prediction Markets, 
May 17, 2007, http://www.pr9.net/comp/development/5575.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008) (describing 
online prediction markets, including prediction markets for German political races, offered by Finan-
cial Times Deutschland). 
 35. Univ. of B.C. Sauder Sch. of Bus., Election Stock Market, http://esm.ubc.ca (last visited Oct. 
30, 2007) (information market predicting outcomes of Canadian elections). 
 36. David Leonhardt, Odds Are, They’ll Know ‘08 Winner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at C1. 
 37. Id. at C6. 
 38. Cherry & Rogers, Markets for Markets, supra note 12, at 351–53, 372–75 (providing survey of 
the subject matter of prediction markets). 
 39. Id. at 348–49, 361, 374. 
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avian-flu epidemic; the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has donated 
nearly $250,000 to this effort.40 
Prediction markets can cover questions ranging from the narrow to 
the extremely broad.  The software company Rite-Solutions, for instance, 
uses an internal prediction market for its business planning.41  And for 
truly big-picture topics—such as the survival of humanity until the year 
2100—Long Bets, funded partly by Amazon.com’s Jeff Bezos, lets any-
one articulate a prediction and open it up to the market.42  (Although 
Long Bets uses real money, the awards go to a charity that the winner se-
lects.)43  Participants on Long Bets include Britain’s astronomer royal 
Martin Rees, the computer scientist Mitchell Kapor, the physicist Free-
man Dyson, and the New York Times journalist John Tierney.44 
Information markets, in short, are a legitimate undertaking, with 
reputable participants making predictions on subjects that matter.  If 
these markets continue to develop, the future could bring remarkably ac-
curate predictions in a number of areas of importance to the legal com-
munity, including Supreme Court decisions and administrative out-
comes.45  The potential subject matter for information markets may, 
ultimately, only be constrained by the limits of human collective knowl-
edge.46 
B. Recent Internet Gambling Legislation 
Unfortunately, recent legislation, to the extent that it applies to in-
formation markets, may create further legal uncertainty that could im-
pede the growth of this important innovation.  In October 2006, Con-
gress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 
(Act).47  The Act was meant to restrict the use of credit cards in Internet 
gambling. In general, it bans persons engaged in the business of betting 
or wagering from accepting, in connection with the participation of an-
 
 40. Mike Stobbe, Health Experts Bet on Spread of Bird Flu, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 1, 
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030100164.html. 
 41. William C. Taylor, Here’s an Idea: Let Everyone Have Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 
C3. 
 42. John Tierney, Can Humanity Survive? Want to Bet on It?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at F1.  
Long Bets can be visited at www.longbets.org. 
 43. Tierney, supra note 42, at F1. 
 44. Id. at F1–F2. 
 45. See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predic-
tive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934 (2004) (proposing use of information markets to 
aid in administrative decision-making process); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and 
the Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 
1142–43 (2006) [hereinafter Cherry & Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices] (proposing Supreme Court 
prediction market). 
 46. Cherry & Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices, supra note 45, at 1195.  Prediction markets may 
also help establish the limits of that knowledge. 
 47. The Act was part of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1952 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5361–5367 West Supp. 2007). 
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other person in “unlawful Internet gambling,”48 the use of credit cards, 
electronic funds transfers, and checks from a financial institution.49  
Remedies include civil actions by attorneys general, both state and fed-
eral, to obtain injunctive relief50 and criminal penalties of fines and im-
prisonment up to five years.51  No explicit private right of action exists.52 
Many real-money prediction markets use credit cards, and to some 
observers, the activities may seem akin to gambling.  (We later discuss 
why there are important differences that the law should recognize.)  In 
light of these surface similarities, one might initially fear that the bill 
would significantly harm prediction markets.  Indeed, some of the earli-
est commentary on the Act expressed exactly these sorts of fears.53  Such 
concerns are understandable and may ultimately prove prophetic.  
Moreover, even if prediction markets ultimately are not covered by this 
law, the very fact such fears exist is significant because it may chill in-
vestment, development, and participation in such markets.  The legal un-
certainty is itself an impediment to the development of this field. 
Fortunately, however, several statutory elements can give at least 
some relief to those who wish to see information markets develop, as 
well as make it less likely that federal prosecutors will unthinkingly treat 
prediction markets as just another form of gambling.  And for the courts 
that may ultimately have to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the 
Act, this statutory language—if interpreted wisely—can avoid the consti-
tutional issues that would otherwise result and thus potentially save the 
statute from what otherwise might be fatal First Amendment problems. 
As one of the first limiting elements, the Act, as a rule of construc-
tion, provides that nothing in the Act “shall be construed as altering, lim-
iting, or extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact pro-
hibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.”54  
The term “gambling” is not defined in the act, so its definition may have 
to be worked out over time.55  Yet, however “gambling” is ultimately de-
 
 48. “Unlawful Internet gambling” is defined in general to mean “to place, receive, or otherwise 
knowingly transmit a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet 
where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal 
lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”  31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10)(A) 
(West Supp. 2007).  We discuss this definition in detail below. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. With this bill we would be surprised to see the creation of a private right of action, if only 
because the statutory interests created seem to belong to governmental bodies rather than to any par-
ticular class of the public.  See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 53. Robert Hahn & Paul Tetlock, Op.-Ed., Short Odds for Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, 
at A17 (“The bigger economic story is how this act, by effectively prohibiting Internet betting, could 
unintentionally slow the emergence of new tools that have the potential to improve the productivity of 
the private sector and the government. Sadly, this is an aspect of the measure that both its supporters 
and its opponents seem to have overlooked.”). 
 54. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361(b). 
 55. One reasonable possibility is for a court to apply the definition of “unlawful Internet gam-
bling” from 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10) to derive a definition of “gambling” for purposes of this act.  Under 
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fined, the implication is that to the extent an information market was per-
missible under U.S. law before the passage of the act, the information 
market remains legal.  This is significant because a large number of suc-
cessful information markets such as the IEM came into existence under 
the pre-Act regulatory regime.  For these markets, the Act may have no 
effect at all.  Other markets have more to worry about,56 but it is worth 
noting that a significant number of information markets may be able to 
continue operations unscathed, particularly if they appear to be academic 
undertakings or use play (virtual) money.57 
In addition, various definitions in the Act suggest that it should not 
apply to many common types of prediction markets.  These include some 
of the markets of perhaps the greatest academic interest, including the 
IEM and proposed markets relating to Supreme Court decisions or ad-
ministrative outcomes.58  To reach this conclusion, we analyze the defini-
tion of “bet or wager” (a key term in the statutory prohibition, as dis-
cussed above) and address the various exemptions from this definition. 
1. Meeting the Definition? 
In key part, the law states that “bet or wager” means 
the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the 
outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject 
to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person or 
another person will receive something of value in the event of a cer-
tain outcome.59 
What does this mean?  Some types of contracts seem obviously cov-
ered, regardless of their occurrence in a setting denominated as a “pre-
diction market.”  Examples might include transactions, whether in trad-
able securities or otherwise, such as the following: 
• “I will give you $20 if Dartmouth beats the University of Texas in 
next Saturday’s football game, and you will give me $20 if Dart-
mouth does not.”60 
 
such an attempt, the most likely definition of “gambling” would be “to place, receive, or otherwise 
knowingly transmit a bet or wager,” with “bet or wager” being defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1). 
 56. Tradesports, for example, settled a regulatory challenge from the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission, discussed in Part III, infra.  For information markets that encountered problems 
under the pre-Act regime, the Act may well pose significant new problems. 
 57. If nothing else, the current legality of a market is an argument that may persuade a credit 
card company to continue processing payments or the Act’s enforcers at the Department of Justice to 
refrain from prosecutions. 
 58. See supra note 45. 
 59. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(A).  The law specifies that this general definition includes the pur-
chase of a chance to win a lottery, the types of schemes in 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (that is, government-
sponsored betting on sports games), and the instructions pertain to the establishment or movement of 
funds to an account with the business of betting or wagering.  See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(B)–(D). 
 60. We are aware, of course, that the two football teams of our alma maters, fine as they may be, 
are unlikely to ever engage in such a contest. 
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• “I bet $20 that Boxer X will defeat Boxer Y in the fight next 
week.” 
• I put down $20 to spin a roulette wheel in cyberspace. 
These sorts of transactions contain a person (1) staking or risking some-
thing of value (2) upon a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game 
subject to chance, (3) with the agreement that this person will get some-
thing of value in the event of a certain outcome.  This may seem rela-
tively straightforward, but it is important to recognize how much of the 
workings of many prediction markets do not meet at least one of these 
requirements, and thus would not be subject to regulation. 
First, any market that does not risk “something of value” would not 
be included.  Although the phrase “something of value” is undefined, 
most likely it means money or some other tangible good, not intangibles 
such as a person’s time, reputation, or emotional satisfaction.61 The use of 
“thing” in the phrase “something of value” suggests this conclusion, and 
were it otherwise, the law would dramatically expand to cover such ac-
tivities as an athlete risking happiness on the outcome of playing basket-
ball with friends, playing board games with one’s family, and other com-
mon activities that Congress almost certainly did not intend to regulate.62  
Such an interpretation would dramatically expand the scope of the stat-
ute, lead to absurd results, and seems far removed from the common un-
derstanding of “gambling” that apparently motivated Congress.  If the 
more limited interpretation is correct—and we think it is, both objec-
tively and as a way to avoid constitutional problems that would result 
from a broader alternative—it follows that any prediction market that 
did not use money or another tangible form of reward would not fall un-
der this legislation.  Examples of such markets include Blogshares,63 
Celebdaq,64 and the Foresight Exchange.65 
Second, any predictive guess that did not rest upon the outcome of 
“a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance” 
would not be covered.  This arguably excludes many of the most socially 
valuable prediction markets dealing with subjects of politics, economics, 
or current events.  Of the three categories of activities that would be re-
 
 61. Indeed, the statute itself specifies that “value” does not include “personal efforts” in playing 
the game or obtaining access to the Internet, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(E)(viii), but this specific exclusion 
should not be able to create coverage not provided by the definition.  In other words, this specific ex-
emption seems best interpreted as an attempt to clarify specifically that personal efforts were not in-
cluded, not as a suggestion that other nontangible rewards (such as emotional satisfaction, admiration 
of peers, sense of fulfillment, and the like) are covered within the meaning of “value.” 
 62. Congressional intent can be multifaceted, of course, but in this case, the legislative concern 
seems to have been about offshore gambling websites.  See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. E2152–53 (daily ed. 
Dec. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Bachus Speech] (statement of Sen. Bachus) (“We needed to pass this law 
because it is the only way we can effectively enforce State and Federal gambling laws when offshore 
Web sites offer illegal services to our residents.”). 
 63. http://www.blogshares.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 64. http://www.bbc.co.uk/celebdaq (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 65. http://www.ideosphere.com (last visited Feb 22, 2008). 
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stricted, the “sporting event” category is perhaps the easiest to under-
stand and probably means athletic competitions: football games and box-
ing matches are clearly covered under this phrase, whereas chess tour-
naments and beauty pageants are probably not because they are not 
traditionally viewed as “sports” (but rather as contests that depend on 
mental skills or physical appearance, not primarily athletic performance).  
A “contest of others” seems to require some sort of a formal contest: 
chess tournaments and beauty pageants would be included under this 
phrase, but economic activity and political elections would probably not.  
Of course, a business’s performance on the stock market or the success 
of a presidential candidate on some level involve competing against other 
companies or would-be leaders, but although comparative judgments are 
involved in the rise of a stock or the election of a president, these do not 
seem to be the sort of formal “contests” that the statute envisions.66  
Likewise, a “game subject to chance” could on some level include politi-
cal elections, but this almost certainly was not what Congress was trying 
to address, and a court wishing a modest and sensible scope for this stat-
ute might well construe the terms more narrowly, along the lines that we 
suggest.  If so, and we think this outcome is more likely than the adop-
tion of expansive alternatives, then information markets that do not in-
volve these three categories, as more modestly defined, should escape 
consequences.  Examples of such markets include the IEM and proposed 
markets to predict executive-branch administrative actions, scientific dis-
coveries, and Supreme Court decisions. 
It then seems that a substantial number of information markets may 
be able to escape the effects of this statute.  Some, like the IEM, are ex-
empt because they are not really engaged in contests, sporting events, or 
games subject to chance within the meaning of the statute.67  Others, such 
as Blogshares and the Foresight Exchange, are not covered because they 
do not reward participants with “something of value” within the meaning 
of the statute.68  Obviously regulations, and possibly litigation, will be 
necessary to clarify if this is indeed the true meaning of the statute, but 
the existence of such potentially limiting arguments should offer at least 
 
 66. If Congress had intended the statute to be this far-reaching, it arguably would have made 
note of it during the proceedings.  Instead, the main concern seems to have been about the far more 
narrower subject of offshore Internet gambling sites.  See, e.g., Bachus Speech, supra note 62, at E2153. 
 67. The IEM is also exempt because they received a no-action letter from the CFTC to run the 
market.  We discuss the implications of this further in our section on CFTC jurisdiction over predic-
tion markets.  See infra Part III. 
 68. It is unclear at this point whether the statute will apply to information markets that reward 
participants not for the result of any one bet (“in the event of a certain outcome,” as the statutory lan-
guage may mean) but rather for predictive success more generally.  If so, a number of prediction mar-
kets that award prizes for general success, as opposed to payouts for any particular event, may escape 
the consequences of the law.  The results of this interpretation could be significant.  Prediction mar-
kets potentially affected by this interpretation include the Hollywood Stock Exchange, Innovation 
Futures, News Futures, and the Political Stock Exchange. 
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some hope to those who fear that the new law will devastate the devel-
opment of information markets. 
2. Exemptions, Exemptions 
The statute also includes several exemptions that can offer even fur-
ther protection for prediction markets.  Should the previously mentioned 
arguments fail, prediction markets, depending on their characteristics, 
may yet obtain protection under these sorts of exemptions. 
For example, the statute exempts from its definition of “bet or wa-
ger” any transaction that is “subject to the rules of a registered entity or 
exempt board of trade under the Commodity Exchange Act.”69  Thus far, 
the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) seems to be one 
of the more aggressive agencies in seeking to regulate information mar-
kets.  The CFTC’s enforcement action against Tradesports, and the 
CFTC’s issuance of a no-action letter to the IEM are examples of its ag-
gressive assertion of authority.70  To the extent that the CFTC does have 
jurisdiction over prediction markets—a matter that still seems not en-
tirely clear—it would at least have the discretion to excuse prediction 
markets from the effect of this Act.71 
Likewise, an exemption exists for participation in any game or con-
test where participants do not stake or risk anything of value other than 
“personal efforts of the participants in playing the game or contest or ob-
taining access to the Internet,”72 or “points or credits that that the spon-
sor of the game or contest provides to participants free of charge and 
that can be used or redeemed only for participation in games or contests 
offered by the sponsor.”73  As discussed above,74 we think this provision 
is best understood as a safe harbor, rather than a carve-out of conduct 
that would otherwise be illegal, but to the extent that it is not, prediction 
markets that meet its conditions will be safe from prosecution.  Signifi-
cantly for academic purposes, the results of such markets may be just as 
accurate, at least according to research that finds that play-money mar-
kets perform as well as those with real-money payouts.75 
Another intriguing exemption is apparently intended for fantasy 
football leagues, but may apply to many prediction markets as well.  The 
provision excludes participation not just in a fantasy or simulation sports 
game, but any “educational game or contest” that meets certain condi-
 
 69. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(E)(ii) (West Supp. 2007). 
 70. See infra Part III. 
 71. CFTC jurisdiction might also have other benefits, as Hahn and Tetlock have argued.  See 
Robert Hahn & Paul Tetlock, Short Odds for Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at A17.  For an en-
capsulation of the debate, see infra Part III. 
 72. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(E)(viii)(I). 
 73. Id. § 5362(1)(E)(viii)(II). 
 74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC 
MARKETS 243 (2004). 
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tions.76  To the extent that an information market involves predictions on 
political, economic, and technological events, the activity is arguably such 
an “educational game or contest.”  If so, these markets would even be 
able to offer monetary awards to successful participants, although with 
certain restrictions, such as not basing the payout on the number of par-
ticipants or the amount of fees paid by those participants.77 
In short, although many prediction market entrepreneurs, partici-
pants, and supporters may understandably be concerned about the effect 
of the new Act, valid reasons exist for hope that information markets 
may be able to continue to develop without substantial harm.  Of course, 
the legal uncertainty creates its own chilling effects, and whether predic-
tion markets continue to develop will depend partly on what regulations 
are passed, what activities the Department of Justice chooses to prose-
cute, and how the courts interpret the statutory definitions.  But all of 
these regulatory and statutory restrictions ultimately are subject to con-
stitutional constraints under the First Amendment, and we now turn to 
identifying some of the expressive elements of prediction markets that, 
we argue, have First Amendment protection. 
II. EXPRESSIVE ELEMENTS OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
We expect most readers will be familiar with general First Amend-
ment principles, and in this section we will not repeat a detailed exposi-
tion of material well covered elsewhere.78  Instead, we want to explore 
how these traditional speech ideas apply in the new context of prediction 
markets.  We start here by identifying the expressive elements present in 
prediction markets.  We also posit that, in addition to the expression of 
those who participate in the markets, the market itself may be a speaker. 
A. Predictive Speech 
Under the First Amendment,79 so-called pure speech receives the 
greatest constitutional protection, based on the conclusion that “the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because soci-
ety finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”80  As a result, regula-
tions that target specific viewpoints or content are constitutionally 
suspect, warranting strict judicial scrutiny to ensure that the government 
 
 76. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(1)(E)(ix). 
 77. See id. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(I)–(III). 
 78. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1994). 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law “abridging the freedom of speech.”). 
 80. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down ban on flag burning). 
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restriction on speech serves a compelling state interest and restricts the 
speech using the least restrictive means.81 
As applied to prediction markets, we begin by considering a type of 
prediction market that involves perhaps the archetypal form of pure po-
litical speech—namely speech related to the outcome of a specific politi-
cal election.  The constitutional protection for such speech becomes 
more complicated when money is involved,82 so for the moment, let us 
envision an information market without financial incentives—something 
like the IEM, but without the $500 of real money at stake.83  In this mar-
ket, individuals would indicate their choice for which candidate will win 
the next U.S. presidential election, with (nonmonetary) awards for suc-
cessful predictions. 
To see the constitutional values at stake in such a market, it is help-
ful to explore why people might participate.  Although individuals might 
do so for a variety of reasons, in general, the participants probably can be 
grouped into two types: those who attempt to provide an objective pre-
diction and those who let their political leanings influence their vote. 
Some of the partisan participants in the information market might 
choose a particular candidate to win because the market participant fa-
vors the candidate, even if a more objective observer might question the 
likelihood of the candidate’s success.  Why?  Perhaps this is simply a 
natural, mental tendency to think that a candidate you prefer should—
and to some people, must—also be popular among the general populace, 
or at least the portion of the population who participate in a prediction 
market.  Alternatively, the partisan participant may deliberately wish to 
create an impression that the candidate has popular support to sway 
other people to join an apparent crowd in supporting a popular candi-
date.  In either of these scenarios, the vote in the information market is 
necessarily an expression of political opinion.  The expression may not 
accurately predict the result, and its value in the information market may 
be debatable,84 but it is undeniably a statement of one’s political view-
point about which candidate should win the election.  In this sense, the 
virtual ballot in a prediction market has analogies both to opinion polling 
and to the casting of the physical ballot on Election Day, at least to the 
 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating strict-
scrutiny test for content-based regulations). 
 82. The realm of campaign finance demonstrates how political speech and monetary funding 
interact, not always with perfectly consistent results.  Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) 
(striking down spending caps on advocacy groups), with McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (up-
holding majority of congressional statute regulating soft-money contributions and electioneering 
communications).  The topic will likely occupy the Supreme Court’s docket for many years to come. 
 83. Such a market would not be fanciful, given that some research suggests that play money 
works as well as real money in ensuring accurate predictions.  See Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 
75, at 243. 
 84. We have explored elsewhere possibilities for screening out such “sheep” voters from partici-
pation in information.  See Cherry & Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices, supra note 45, at 1169–70. 
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extent that both involve an expression of support for one’s desired can-
didate. 
In contrast, other participants in the prediction market might have 
nonpartisan motivations.  These voters might dispassionately assess a 
candidate’s likelihood of success and then translate those conclusions 
into a prediction.  This is not speech expressing one’s political prefer-
ences, but it is an informed prediction about a particular event.  And 
while the First Amendment case law more frequently involves individu-
als trying to express their political desires,85 the fact that speech is more 
dispassionate (less “partisan”) does not render it less worthy of constitu-
tional protection.  Indeed, to the extent that the First Amendment’s utili-
tarian purposes to find truth are helped more by light than heat, dispas-
sionate speech might be worthy of more protection, not less.86 
This hypothetical about speech regarding political elections is one 
of the easiest areas in which to see the constitutionally protected func-
tions.  When one moves from this hypothetical to some of the other sub-
jects traded on prediction markets, speech that in analogous contexts 
would be constitutionally protected also quickly appears.  Consider, for 
example, the range of topics for trade on www.intrade.com.87  One of-
fered topic was the possibility of an air strike on Iran, on which an in-
formed prediction would require a participant to evaluate the willingness 
of Iran to pursue nuclear capabilities despite international opposition, 
the resolve of the United Nations to use force to stop Iran, and the appe-
tite of the Bush administration for engaging in another conflict in the 
Middle East despite the problems with the war in Iraq.88  Another topic 
was the possibility of Hamas’s recognition of Israel, a vote on which 
might entail assessments not just of Hamas’s objections but also of Israeli 
reactions and the long-term possibilities for a peaceful resolution be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians.89 
If a citizen were to write a letter to a newspaper expressing an opin-
ion about the likelihood of these events occurring in Iran and Israel, that 
prediction would clearly be protected under the First Amendment as po-
litical speech.  A key question that this article presents is whether the ex-
pression should be any less protected if it is presented not in a newspaper 
but in a prediction market. 
 
 85. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (protecting flag burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405 (1974) (reversing conviction for hanging a flag with a peace symbol to protest the invasion of 
Cambodia and killings at Kent State University); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 392 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(protecting wearing black armbands as symbolic expression). 
 86. We do not mean to suggest that partisan speech does not deserve protection.  Our point is 
merely that the relative dispassionateness of some participants in an information market does not 
thereby render the market less deserving of First Amendment protection. 
 87. Intrade Prediction Markets, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
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Prediction markets frequently include not just political topics, but 
economic ones as well.  At first glance, political speech might seem dif-
ferent from economic topics such as whether the Federal Reserve will 
raise interest rates or whether the Standard & Poor’s 500 index of stocks 
of large U.S. companies will rise or fall.90  We submit, however, that in-
herent in such predictions are frequently the sorts of assessments of po-
litical leaders that traditionally receive First Amendment protection.  For 
example, setting the federal funds rate involves judgments of the Federal 
Reserve Board about how best to attempt to manage the economy.  If 
one trusts the governors to respond prudently, one might predict modest 
increases to combat perceived inflation or modest decreases to stimulate 
the economy in a perceived recession.  Alternatively, if one mistrusts the 
judgment of the Federal Reserve, one might predict vastly different be-
havior (such as flooding the market with liquidity resulting in a housing 
bubble and the continued devaluation of the currency, for example). 
Not every topic is political, of course, and economic predictions may 
also involve nonpolitical elements (such as statistical data).  Yet in gen-
eral, it still seems that not far below the surface of many economic pre-
dictions lies a type of assessment of political leaders that warrants First 
Amendment prediction.  And, indeed, courts have afforded First 
Amendment protection even to speech that involves economic rather 
than political topics.91 
Of course, some subjects (such as the amount of snowfall in New 
York City)92 might not involve politics or economics at all.  And some of 
these subjects, like entertainment predictions about a Hollywood movie’s 
success, may seem far removed from the matters of democratic self-
governance that the First Amendment assists.93  Nevertheless, the courts 
have given First Amendment protections to areas far removed from po-
litical speech, including speech that is pornographic94 or that involves 
largely nonpolitical activities such as a St. Patrick’s Day parade.95  Like-
wise, speech involving art, science, literature, and even lighthearted en-
 
 90. Both the Federal Funds rate and the close of the Standard & Poor’s 500 were topics available 
for prediction on February 5, 2006, at Intrade.  See id. 
 91. See, e.g., Lindenbaum v. City of Phila., 584 F. Supp. 1190, 1194–95 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (“Al-
though the right of association is most commonly conceived of in terms of political associations, the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts have recognized that economic speech and associations are 
not excluded from the guarantees of the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
 92. A subject for prediction on February 5, 2006, at Intrade.  Intrade Prediction Markets, supra 
note 87. 
 93. Movie box office receipts are predicted on The Hollywood Stock Exchange, http://www.hsx. 
com (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 94. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (pro-
tecting nude dancing as expression); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 95. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995).  
The Court found that some expressive elements did exist in the parade, even though it was not primar-
ily about political topics. 
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tertainment has all received First Amendment protection.96  Thus, the 
fact that a prediction market might involve a prediction about celebrities 
instead of presidential elections does not seem to mean that the speech is 
therefore unprotected.  And snowfall in New York?  Perhaps no gov-
ernment official would be so foolish to try to control talk about the 
weather, but we have little doubt that such a ban on predicting snowfall 
would not pass constitutional muster.97 
B. I Speak, We Speak: The Market as Speaker 
In the last section, we were primarily concerned with analyzing the 
expressive interests of those individuals who decided to trade on their 
knowledge and opinions in a prediction market.  In this section, however, 
we focus on the market itself.  We argue that the market is, ultimately, a 
composite of its traders and that the aggregate prediction the market 
generates also deserves constitutional protection. 
Although we do not wish to unduly anthropomorphize an economic 
construct unduly, in this instance we believe “speaker” accurately de-
scribes the prediction market itself.  Recall, as discussed above, that pre-
diction markets aggregate large numbers of trades, which are the results 
of numerous decisions made by individual participants.98  Consequently, 
the market price and the resulting prediction is a summary, or a snap-
shot, of the collective knowledge of the market at a particular point in 
time.  The price of the security encodes useful information about indi-
viduals’ trades, and therefore aggregates their opinions into a number.  
That number is the prediction about what is going to happen.  In doing 
so, the market articulates a viewpoint and predicts the outcome of a fu-
ture event. 
Although prediction markets are relatively new constructs, the idea 
of mechanical devices or other inanimate objects being able to “speak” is 
not.  There are many situations where meaning is encoded through me-
chanical devices.  For example, a seismometer reads geologic activity and 
predicts earthquakes, and similar equipment functions to predict the 
eruption of volcanoes.  The First Amendment protects scientific informa-
tion, regardless of how dry or technical the scientific facts may be,99 and 
that result should not change merely because the scientific facts happen 
 
 96. See, e.g., Daniel Mach, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and the First Amend-
ment, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (1997) (discussing the relationship of art and the First Amend-
ment). 
 97. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 768 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (implying that 
the First Amendment would protect a citizen approaching another citizen to ask about a weather fore-
cast); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 642 (Colo. 1999) (stating that “forecasting a change in 
weather” is protected by the First Amendment). 
 98. See supra Part II.A. 
 99. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Even dry information, 
devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression, has been accorded First Amendment 
protection.”). 
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to register on a machine.  That is because an individual scientist could 
take all the factors into account (as a machine does automatically) and 
express an opinion about the likelihood of a volcanic eruption.  If a scien-
tist did this manually, that opinion would certainly constitute protected 
expression.  If so, can reading the numbers off a predictive device lack 
such protection?  Certainly our intuition seems to suggest otherwise. 
Similarly, the fact that the market is speaking by making its predic-
tions in the realm of cyberspace does not change the analysis.  In a recent 
article, Professor David McGowan discusses the similarities and differ-
ences between speech in real and virtual worlds and explains a concept 
that he terms “social friction.”100  According to McGowan, many of the 
traditional norms of behavior (for example, only being able to protest in 
one place at one set time) are different in cyberspace (where one could 
conceivably register disapproval in a number of different cyber venues 
almost simultaneously).101  At the same time, McGowan ultimately ar-
gues that judges are deciding the cases based on the context of the real 
world—which he argues, may mean that the distance between the real 
and virtual worlds will never be able to stray too far apart.102 
Courts that have considered the question have determined that 
computer code, like musical symbols or works written in a language 
other than English, do have an expressive interest, despite the fact that 
they may only be intelligible to a certain subset of the population.103  In 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli, the defendants mar-
keted a computer program, Recurrence, that they claimed would auto-
matically allow users to make money from currency trades.104  The pro-
gram would analyze the currency data, and then instruct the user to buy, 
sell, or hold.105  Although the court determined that computer code itself 
could be expressive, in this case the court denied protection to the Re-
currence system because the language in the computer program was not 
used to express opinion, but rather was used “to induce action without 
the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient.”106  While the 
facts in Vartuli were vastly different from the context of prediction mar-
kets (prediction markets rely entirely on the independent thoughts of 
traders), the test articulated in the case makes a good deal of sense. 
Ultimately, the court in Vartuli, and other courts that have consid-
ered the question seem to be resolving the question of whether computer 
code is protected by looking at the substance and purpose of what is be-
 
 100. David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of Code Tell 
Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515 (2003). 
 101. Id. at 1517. 
 102. Id. at 1598–99. 
 103. Corley, 273 F.3d at 445–46; see also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Be-
cause computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about 
computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 104. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n  v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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ing communicated.  Seemingly, if the material in question furthers the 
“pursuit of truth, the accommodation among interests, the achievement 
of social stability, the exposure and deterrence of abuses of authority, 
personal autonomy and personality development, or the functioning of a 
democracy” then it will obtain First Amendment protection.107  Cur-
rently, prediction markets encompass matters that advance some or all of 
these goals.  The fact that the market is speaking in cyberspace hardly 
changes the analysis. 
The fact that the market is acting as a speaker becomes even clearer 
in the case where a founder might establish a market with a certain po-
litical purpose in mind.  For example, the founder of a prediction market 
might want to call attention to the fact that human-rights violations still 
occur with regular frequency.108  Participants in the market could be 
asked to predict the number of a certain type of human-rights violations 
per country (say, execution of political prisoners), or they might be asked 
to predict which country would improve its reputation by releasing po-
litical prisoners.  In this instance the “point” of the market might go be-
yond the value of the prediction itself.  By establishing the market, the 
founder would call attention to a particular problem in hopes of achiev-
ing a particular result.  In that sense, the act of establishing and running 
the market, then, could be the expression of a particular opinion. 
Moreover, because the overall market represents the aggregated 
judgment of the individual speakers, it would seem somewhat perverse if 
the judgment of the market itself enjoyed fewer constitutional rights than 
those enjoyed by its component participants.  This is particularly true 
when a significant portion of the value of the information markets results 
precisely from the fact that the market provides an aggregate judgment 
that is more likely to be accurate than that of the individual participants. 
But so what?  Why should society care about protecting these sorts 
of predictions?  One reason would be that such predictions are consistent 
with the “truth seeking” function of the First Amendment.109  Another 
good reason is similarly utilitarian: we need to hear honest predictions 
about what the future holds—even when they tell us what we do not 
want to hear. 
In Homer’s Iliad, the princess Cassandra had the power to predict 
the future, but suffered from an unusual curse: no one accepted her pre-
 
 107. Id. (citing Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989)). 
 108. For additional information on human rights violations, see the website for advocacy group 
Amnesty International.  Amnesty Int., http://amnesty.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
 109. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (describing the lack of value of 
false and defamatory statements because “they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the mar-
ketplace of ideas”); see also Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Juris-
prudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 161 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“The theory of the marketplace of ideas focuses on ‘the truth-seeking 
function’ of the First Amendment.  It extends the shelter of constitutional protection to speech so that 
we can better understand the world in which we live.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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dictions.110  Like Cassandra, information markets have repeatedly been 
shown to make accurate predictions.111  But as information markets be-
come more widespread and familiar, they may begin to cover subjects 
that some people might find offensive.  As the myth of Cassandra illus-
trates, not all predictions are welcome.  The markets may foretell out-
comes that we, as a society, would prefer not to contemplate.  Further, 
certain subject areas may be controversial because they involve a sensi-
tive topic, because a topic has important consequences for a particular 
group, or because of the seriousness of the rights at stake.  Such contro-
versy may be engendered either because of the substance of what the 
market is predicting about a particular area or the inherent aversion to 
the commodification of particular topics.112  Yet, it is these unpopular 
markets that may be most in need of First Amendment protection. 
As one example, consider the ill-fated Policy Analysis Market 
(PAM) of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
that addressed terrorism and Mideast policy.113  This market provoked 
considerable political controversy.114  Opponents feared that terrorists 
might “game the market,” either committing violent activities for profit 
or manipulating the market to hide their unlawful activities.115  Senators 
Ron Wyden and Bryon Dorgan claimed that PAM was “offensive” and 
“ridiculous,”116 while Senator Tom Daschle criticized PAM because it 
“could provide an incentive actually to commit terrorism.”117  Under such 
criticism, the project was terminated. 
This market was government sponsored, and of course, the govern-
ment has no affirmative constitutional obligation to fund it.  But the ani-
mosity shown against PAM was striking, and we fear it may have impli-
 
 110. See HOMER, THE ILIAD 353, 611 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1990); see also  
THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 250 (1948); EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 292 
(1942). 
 111. See supra Part I. 
 112. See generally RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).  Questions about morals and markets 
are fascinating and deserve further close study. 
 113. In the summer of 2003, DARPA announced a program, FutureMap, which proposed infor-
mation markets to predict events in the Middle East as well as potential terrorist attacks. Tim Harford, 
All Bets Are Off at the Pentagon, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at 14; You Bet Your Life: Futures Markets 
Won’t Solve a Real Intelligence Problem, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at 10. There were two markets 
comprising FutureMap: one was to be composed of policy experts and law enforcement officials, cut-
ting across internal government agencies and relying on classified information.  See SUROWIECKI, su-
pra note 19, at 79.  The second portion of FutureMap, the Policy Analysis Market (PAM), was to be 
open to the general public.  See Robin Hanson, Decision Markets for Policy Advice, in PROMOTING 
THE GENERAL WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 151, 165 (Alan S. 
Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik eds., 2006). 
 114. Harebrained Scheme to Bet on Terrorism Deserved to Die, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 2, 2003, at 
6D; see also Carl Hulse & Thom Shanher, Senators Want to Block Spending on Terrorist Initiatives, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at A20. 
 115. See Harford, supra note 113. 
 116. Ken Guggenheim, Pentagon Terrorism Market Riles Lawmakers, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 29, 2003,    
§ 1, at 11. 
 117. Harford, supra note 113. 
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cations for other privately run prediction markets.  Suppose a wholly pri-
vate organization wanted to run a market on Middle East events and ter-
rorism open to the general public without any type of government fund-
ing or support.  If a government sought to quash it, such efforts would 
run into the First Amendment problems discussed above.  And beyond 
the purely legal rights of free expression, such attempts risk depriving 
citizens and the nation of information it might vitally need. 
The analogy to Cassandra is again apt.  The Trojans needed to hear 
that, despite their ostensible victory over the Greeks, the giant horse was 
not what it appeared to be.  Yet they shut their ears to the prophetess, 
and the result was disastrous.118  Similarly, information markets offer the 
promise of giving individuals and governments insights into an uncertain 
future, and it seems fundamentally unwise to reject this sort of knowl-
edge because its creation may spark certain associations with gambling. 
It is to those associations—not only with gambling, but also with other 
regulated subjects such as securities and commodities trading, that we 
now turn. 
III. EXPRESSION THROUGH MARKETS: THE DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER 
REGULATED ACTIVITIES 
In this section, we seek to distinguish prediction markets from other 
forms of business activity that have traditionally been seen as subject to 
regulation without particular regard for their expressive qualities.  Al-
though on the surface commodities trading, securities trading, and gam-
bling share similarities to the activity that takes place in a prediction 
market, we contend that information markets have certain unique char-
acteristics that separate them from these other areas.  After a careful ex-
amination of the characteristics of prediction markets, it becomes evident 
that they involve expression of opinions in a way that these other types 
of regulated activities do not.  These differences should lead to increased 
First Amendment protection for information markets. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that there are no clear bright-
line tests regarding these various forms of regulated activities.  If any-
thing, an in-depth analysis indicates the difficulty of attempting clear 
categorization.  Numerous commentators have argued—quite persua-
sively—that some of these categories blur together at the edges.119  To 
use a common example, stock day-trading—that is, executing a large 
number of stock trades in a short amount of time based on short-term in-
 
 118. See HOMER, supra note 110. 
 119. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities 
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375 
(2005); Hurt, supra note 3, at 403; Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, 
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, 
Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791 
(1997). 
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creases or decreases—falls closer to gambling than to traditional invest-
ing.120  Despite the somewhat fuzzy boundaries between these different 
activities, prediction markets have important distinguishing characteris-
tics.  First, to a greater extent than gambling, they involve the partici-
pant’s expression of their knowledge, skill, and opinion about the likeli-
hood of a particular outcome in the future.  Second, prediction markets 
involve a transcendent expressive purpose—the generating of a conclu-
sion about a future event—that goes above and beyond the mere results, 
i.e. the allocative gains or losses that take place in the market.  We begin 
our examination with a discussion of gambling, as that seems to be the 
area that has created the most controversy, especially given the recent 
legislation on internet betting.121 
A. Gambling 
Games of chance, races, and other forms of gambling have existed 
as recreation and leisure activities for thousands of years.122  The law has 
tended to distinguish gambling from other forms of activity, such as in-
vesting in the stock market, based on the idea that gambling is a form of 
entertainment, perhaps even a vice, and that gambling involves elements 
of luck, randomness, or chance.123  As other commentators have pointed 
out, however, some of these distinctions between gambling and investing 
are artificial, socially constructed, and largely based on socioeconomic 
class.124  While the lower classes engage in (immoral) gambling, the upper 
classes engage in similar activities, but these activities are considered 
productive and denominated “investments.”125 
Historically, gambling in the United States has either been outlawed 
completely or highly regulated,126 in part because gambling has tradition-
ally been associated with vice, moral weakness, and poverty.  Organized 
 
 120. See Hurt, supra note 3, at 403. 
 121. See supra Part I.B. 
 122. DAVID WEINSTEIN & LILLIAN DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING 7–8 (1974) 
(noting that lotteries existed in ancient Rome, and that the Virginia Company used a lottery in 1612 to 
finance the Jamestown settlement). 
 123. Finster v. Keller, 96 Cal. Rptr. 241, 246 (Ct. App. 1971) (“It is the character of the game 
rather than a particular player’s skill or lack of it that determines whether the game is one of chance or 
skill.  The test is not whether the game contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which 
of them is the dominating factor in determining the result of the game.”). 
 124. See Hurt, supra note 3, at 403 (“Gambling threatens social order; in the throw of the dice, a 
commoner can become a wealthy citizen, a slave a freedman.  Gambling is anathema to the Puritan 
work ethic, but it also violates unspoken values of knowing one’s place and living within one’s class.  In 
addition, historically, financial speculation was engaged in by the elite; therefore, it was respectable.  
Gaming speculation, especially as engaged in by the poorer classes, was frowned upon and at times 
prohibited.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (“Through 
most of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, Congress adhered to a policy that not only dis-
couraged the operation of lotteries and similar schemes, but forbade the dissemination of information 
concerning such enterprises by use of the mails, even when the lottery in question was chartered by a 
state legislature.”). 
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crime rings have long used gambling, bookmaking, and related activities 
as a way to launder money from other illegal activities, such as prostitu-
tion, loan sharking, and drug sales.127  In addition, some individuals with 
susceptible personalities can become addicted to gambling, leading to 
emotional distress and, in extreme cases, financial ruin.128  When gam-
bling occurs in the form of state-sponsored lotteries, it has been criticized 
as imposing a regressive tax, disproportionately taking money from the 
poor and uneducated to subsidize the public fisc.129  For all these reasons, 
gambling has historically been seen as an activity requiring a high level of 
policing and regulation.130 
Despite these deep-rooted views, restrictions on gambling have 
eased in recent years.131  Currently, gambling law in the United States is a 
patchwork of regulation.132  In some states, gambling is legal, in others it 
is outlawed, and in still others, there is a combination, with some forms 
of gambling allowed and some forbidden.133  Within this patchwork, how-
ever, gambling has made recent and dramatic inroads.  Native American 
tribes have been able to support lagging local economies through reve-
nues generated from casinos located on reservations.134  State govern-
ments have themselves moved toward a system where education and 
other vital services are often supported through state-sponsored lotter-
 
 127. See William K. Rashbaum, Kerik Described as Close to Deal on a Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2006, at A1 (describing continuing efforts to keep businesses with organized crime ties out of 
Atlantic City); Tom Troncone, Gambling a Very Big Winner for the Mob; Sports Betting Finances Eve-
rything Else It Does, RECORD, Feb. 19, 2006, at A18 (noting the link between the Lucchese family and 
illegal gambling in Atlantic City). 
 128. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
671–74 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) (noting that lifetime prevalence of Pathological Gambling in adults 
ranges from 0.4% to 3.4% in adults and 2.8% to 8% in adolescents and college students).  Gambler’s 
Anonymous defines a compulsive gambler as “a person whose gambling has caused growing and con-
tinuing problems in any department of his or her life.”  See Gamblersanonymous.org, Questions and 
Answers, http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/qna.html (last visited February 2, 2007). 
 129. See Todd A. Wyett, State Lotteries: Regressive Taxes in Disguise, 44 TAX LAW. 867, 867, 875–
76 (1991) (reprinting economic studies and arguing that “state-run lotteries are the most regressive 
means of taxation in existence in the United States today”). 
 130. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of 
State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 14–20 (1992) (providing historical overview of gam-
bling and its regulation). 
 131. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 187 (“Whatever its character in 1934 when 
[the ban on casino advertising] was adopted, the federal policy of discouraging gambling in general, 
and casino gambling in particular, is now decidedly equivocal.”). 
 132. See id. at 186–87 (describing changing regulatory landscape for gambling). 
 133. See, e.g., State Gambling Law Summary for all U.S. States, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/ 
State-Law-Summary/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (showing the differences between judicial tests, 
whether internet gambling is expressly forbidden, and whether violations are misdemeanors or felo-
nies). 
 134. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2000 & Supp. 2004)); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission In-
dians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (Supreme Court case clearing the way for tribal gaming); Kevin K. 
Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 285, 285–93 (2004) (providing 
an overview of history and authority for Native American gaming); Naomi Mezey, Note, The Distribu-
tion of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711 (1996). 
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ies.135  These regulatory inconsistencies point, perhaps, to deeply con-
flicted cultural views toward gambling. 
There have been several constitutional challenges to the regulation 
of advertising for gambling and lotteries, with varying results.  In Posa-
das de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,136 the Supreme 
Court considered a law that allowed casinos in Puerto Rico to advertise 
to tourists, but banned advertisements aimed at residents of Puerto Rico.  
Applying the Central Hudson test, the court upheld the ban, reasoning 
that the legislation advanced a state interest in promoting tourism and 
simultaneously limiting gambling among residents, especially given the 
link between gambling and crime.137  In United States v. Edge Broadcast-
ing Co.,138 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a prohi-
bition against advertising the Virginia lottery on the radio in North Caro-
lina, a state that had no lottery.  The Supreme Court again upheld the 
advertising ban under the Central Hudson test, reasoning that otherwise 
states would have no ability to shield citizens from lottery advertise-
ments.139  However, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United 
States,140 the court struck down an advertising ban that prevented Louisi-
ana casinos from advertising to Louisiana residents.141  After describing 
the changing regulatory landscape, the Supreme Court concluded that 
there was no principled distinction that would allow for advertisement of 
tribal gaming in Louisiana while simultaneously banning advertisement 
for nontribal casinos.142 
All of these constitutional challenges dealing with gambling and 
commercial speech arose in the same context—the First Amendment 
right to advertise casinos or other gambling.  None of these lawsuits chal-
lenged the government’s right to regulate gambling itself.  In fact, the de-
cisions rest on the conclusion that the government could decide to ban 
gambling activity altogether, and included in that power is the lesser abil-
 
 135. Rychlak, supra note 130, at 11 n.2 (performing fifty-state survey and concluding that as of 
1992 thirty-three states sponsored a lottery).  It could be argued that the prevalence of state-sponsored 
lotteries undercut any notion of the state having a regulatory interest in any form of gambling, given 
that the state is promoting this type of activity, albeit in a monopolistic form in order to raise revenue.  
On the other hand, critics of the lottery have argued that this is one of the worst ways for states to 
raise revenue, as it preys on vulnerable populations and exacerbates the effect of income inequality.  
See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (advocating retaining the lottery, but restricting its advertising); Wyett, supra 
note 129, at 875 (advocating other methods of raising revenue). 
 136. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 137. Id. at 341–42. 
 138. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 139. Id. at 435–36. 
 140. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
 141. Id. at 191. 
 142. Id. (“[The Government] presents no convincing reason for pegging its speech ban to the 
identity of the owners or operators of the advertised casinos.  The Government cites revenue needs of 
States and tribes that conduct casino gambling, and notes that net revenues generated by the tribal 
casinos are dedicated to the welfare of the tribes and their members.  Yet the Government admits that 
tribal casinos offer precisely the same types of gambling as private casinos.” (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
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ity to regulate advertising.143  First Amendment jurisprudence tradition-
ally holds that ordinary business activity (absent an expressive element), 
and gambling in particular, because of its association with “vice activity,” 
is not entitled to First Amendment protection.144  To some degree, this 
distinction makes some sense, as the act of putting money down on the 
outcome of a random event does not involve the expression of any par-
ticular thought or idea.  If, for example, the outcome of a spin of a rou-
lette wheel is that a ball lands on a particular number, the choice of a 
number does not involve expression.  The same would be true of other 
games of pure chance—the outcome of the roll of the dice, or the flip of a 
card.  The pull on the handle of a slot machine does not express anything 
other than a willingness to try one’s luck with a one-armed bandit. 
Certain elements of recreational gambling, however, involve more 
than just pure chance.  As other commentators have remarked, certain 
card games rely on a mix of chance and skill.145  So, for example, a poker 
player will have to determine, based on an assessment of the risks and 
reward involved, whether they should continue to bet or fold their 
hand.146  Other forms of recreational gambling, such as sports betting or 
horse racing, involve an element of chance or luck, and at the same time 
require, for a successful outcome,  an element of knowledge.  Is one team 
particularly good this year?147  What is a horse’s—literal—track record?148  
All of this information is potentially available to gamblers and they may 
take advantage of this knowledge to increase their chances of winning. 
Even in these instances, however, it becomes apparent that gam-
blers do not have a particular expressive interest in whether a particular 
card is turned over or in whether their horse wins.  (There may be some 
affection for, or affiliation with, a home team, but we suspect that this 
expressive interest typically is, at most, of secondary importance to the 
gambler.)  Furthermore, the subject of the betting—who wins the horse-
race—is not of particular societal interest other than to those individuals 
 
 143. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 427. 
 144. Id. 
 145. MIKE CARO, CARO’S FUNDAMENTAL SECRETS OF WINNING POKER 108–20 (2002). 
 146. Id.; see also Steven Lubet, Lawyers’ Poker, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283, 286–87 (1993) (describ-
ing skills involved in poker game and analogizing them to skills used in litigation). 
 147. A recent piece has examined sports betting, contending that there is no difference between 
such sports betting and online day trading.  See Christopher T. Pickens, Note, Of Bookies and Brokers: 
Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does it Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227 
(2006).  The author conflates prediction markets and sports betting.  See generally id.  Further, the 
prediction markets analysis seems to almost be tacked on to the rest of the piece, for the author’s main 
argument is that the government should legalize sports betting.  Pickens justifies this argument by dis-
puting that there is any distinction between investing and gambling.  Id. at 247–51.  However, part of 
his argument rests on two extremely questionable assumptions, those being that betting functions as a 
hedging device and that it adds social value.  See id. at 239–44. 
 148. Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” In Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: The Histori-
cal and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473 (2004) 
(describing history of horseracing and its regulation in the United States). 
CHERRY.DOC 3/31/2008  9:45:29 AM 
No. 3] PREDICTION MARKETS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 859 
who happen to have money at stake.149  A significant percentage of pre-
diction markets, on the other hand, involve larger-scale concerns about 
politics, whether certain scientific events will occur, and other questions 
that directly impact on core speech values. 
We also wish to note that many of the concerns correlated with 
gambling do not exist with prediction markets.  There is no indication, at 
present, that prediction markets have any link to organized crime, or 
have any affiliation with the vice-related activities that criminals engage 
in.  Finally, there is no proof that participation in prediction markets is 
any more addicting than investing in the traditional capital markets.  Ac-
curate predictions of future events are unlikely to lead individuals into 
moral decay.  With these thoughts in mind, we turn to another area, se-
curities trading, that bears similarities to the activity that occurs in pre-
diction markets. 
B. Securities Trading 
During the nineteenth century, the capital markets became the driv-
ing force behind the industrial revolution, the expansion of the railroads, 
and the increasing mechanization of the production of goods.150  The 
modern view of securities regulation in the United States had as its gene-
sis the Great Depression of the 1930s.151  After the stock market crash of 
1929, Congress took action to protect the integrity of the capital markets, 
culminating in the 1933 and 1934 Securities and Exchange Acts.152  The 
overwhelming thrust of these acts was on the twin goals of disclosure and 
transparency, so that investors would be able to make informed choices 
regarding the allocation of resources.153  Through initial public offerings, 
issuers receive money that may be needed for expansion, and investors 
are encouraged to put their money in the market through the ease of en-
try and exit available because of the liquidity of the secondary trading 
market.154 
 
 149. Of course, there are exceptions to this too.  See LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN 
AMERICAN LEGEND (2001) (detailing inspirational story of popular racing horse). 
 150. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
35–36 (5th ed. 2004); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 39–72 (3d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the passage of the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934). 
 151. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (describing the 
securities laws as “designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses which were 
found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930’s”); LOSS 
& SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 35–36. 
 152. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450 (2002) (“[T]he primary policy of the federal securities laws involves the 
remediation of information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the information available to outside 
investors and insiders.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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The traditional wisdom has generally been that securities may be 
regulated just as any other business activity is regulated, and that free 
speech arguments are inapplicable.155  Several commentators have either 
explored or questioned this assumption,156 but these types of arguments 
have had only limited success.157  As described above, the system of secu-
rities regulation is predicated upon the issuer’s disclosure of accurate in-
formation, especially because stocks themselves do not have an inherent 
fixed value.158  The First Amendment concerns vis-à-vis securities law are 
broadly clustered in four areas: regulation of the provision of financial 
advice,159 the quiet period and other speech restrictions surrounding the 
initial registration of securities,160 mandatory disclosure,161 and rules regu-
lating proxies.162 
Perhaps the most contentious clash of securities law and the First 
Amendment to date has been in the context of the provision of financial 
advice.  In Lowe v. SEC, the petitioner, Lowe, was a financial advisor 
who was convicted of stealing from a bank, misappropriating funds from 
a client, and other equally nefarious activities.163  After the SEC barred 
Lowe from providing clients with investment advice, he set up a newslet-
ter that provided financial news and tracked certain stocks.164  Lowe’s 
 
 155. Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 223 
(1990) (“The received wisdom for fifty years has been that the first amendment is inapplicable to 
speech relating to the operation of securities markets.  The assumption that speech by actors on the 
securities stage is simply another aspect of regulable business activity pervades the federal system of 
securities regulation . . . .”). 
 156. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First 
Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 194 (1994) (arguing that some securities regulation laws violated 
the First Amendment); Estreicher, supra note 155 (exploring the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the securities laws); Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the 
Press: Toward a Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 843 
(1985) (arguing that securities regulation laws must comply with the First Amendment); Antony Page 
& Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 84 (2005) (answering the question in the affirmative); Nicholas Wolfson, The First 
Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 266 (1988) (arguing that securities regulation laws 
and other forms of commercial speech should be highly constitutionally protected); cf. David A. Hoff-
man, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1426–27 (2006) (analyzing potentially mis-
leading “puffing” statements in the context of securities fraud). 
 157. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s approach to commercial speech and to corporate disclosures are headed for a clash, but may 
be reconciled through an institutional approach, which would still allow for a robust system of corpo-
rate disclosure). 
 158. See Seligman, supra note 152. 
 159. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 80b-6 (West Supp. 2007); Lowe v. SEC, 472 
U.S. 181, 183 (1985). 
 160. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000 & Supp. 2004) (preventing “gun jumping,” i.e. advertising 
before the registration statement has been approved); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (famous Rule 10b-
5, which broadly prevents fraud in the sale of securities). 
 161. A system of integrated disclosure is mandated by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 162. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2007) (preventing fraud in the solicitation of proxies). 
 163. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183. 
 164. Id. at 184–85. 
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newsletter also included a “hotline” readers could call to request more 
information.165  In response, the SEC sought an injunction to prevent 
Lowe from participating in any further investment advisory publica-
tions.166  The case turned on the question of whether Lowe was providing 
individualized investment advice (permissible for the SEC to regulate), 
or whether he was writing more broadly about finance (which would fall 
into an exemption in the statute).167  The Supreme Court read the news-
letter as a more general publication about finance, construed it within the 
exemption, and therefore resolved the issue without reaching the First 
Amendment issues.168  However, as the concurrence rightly pointed out, 
the statutory result seemed to be compelled by constitutional considera-
tions.169 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Lowe precipitated a 
good deal of academic discussion,170 the decision failed to signal any sig-
nificant shift with regard to the other areas that had been identified as 
potentially conflicting with the First Amendment, viz registration, disclo-
sure, and proxy statements.  Perhaps in part that is because these other 
areas are fundamentally concerned with protecting investors from fraud, 
and fraudulent speech does not receive protection under the First 
Amendment.171  Indeed, speech intended to defraud or mislead seems to 
run counter to the fundamental truth-seeking function of the First 
Amendment.  Further, although it is relatively easy to criticize the exist-
ing structure of securities regulation in terms of pointing out its conflicts 
with the First Amendment, it is difficult to offer a less restrictive alterna-
tive that would still protect investors.  Any effort to regulate the actual 
value or content of the security—an option that was debated during the 
New Deal period, and rejected172—would seem to be more invasive to 
business, in many ways, than the current regulatory regime. 
In any event, prediction markets and the securities markets function 
differently, and therefore the type of regulation applied to prediction 
markets would need to be tailored accordingly.  The focus of traditional 
public stock markets is the rapid accumulation of capital, along with the 
accompanying liquidity and ease of trading available to investors.  Al-
though the price-discovery function certainly exists in the capital mar-
kets—revealing whether some companies, or indeed entire technologies 
or industries, are on the rise or in decline—the fact is that these informa-
tion discovery functions are arguably secondary to any sort of predictive 
 
 165. Id. at 185. 
 166. Id. at 184–85. 
 167. Id. at 209–10. 
 168. Id. at 209–11. 
 169. Id. at 236 (White, J., concurring). 
 170. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 171; Estreicher, supra note 155, at 296–99. 
 171. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE 132–38 (1989) (discuss-
ing slight value of fraudulent or false speech). 
 172. See SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 39–72. 
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or expressive capacity.  With prediction markets, there is no underlying 
investment in a company or any residual claim to a company’s earnings 
or assets. 
Prediction markets exist to collect and aggregate information that 
individuals have; thus, the periodic disclosures mandated by the 1934 
Act173 would be largely superfluous.  The amounts of money involved are 
tiny, compared with investments in the traditional stock market.  Al-
though many of the same issues with insider trading might be of concern 
in information markets, certain parties could be barred from participa-
tion and there are other ways to prevent market manipulation.174  Be-
cause these risks can be countered and controlled for in a properly de-
signed prediction market, the worries that have led to extensive SEC 
oversight in the securities context do not seem applicable to prediction 
markets. 
A final, but important, distinction is that most investors in the secu-
rities market buy stock to enrich themselves, not to express any particu-
lar viewpoint or make any sort of statement.  Of course, just as with 
sports betting, there may be some sense of loyalty or support in an inves-
tor’s choice of one stock over another.  An investor might make the 
choice to support a business because is located in a particular region of 
the country, because a particular firm evidences good management or 
employment practices, or because that firm otherwise engages in socially 
responsible choices.175  Yet seemingly the vast majority of investors are in 
the market because they wish to increase the long-term value of their 
holdings and make money, not to express themselves. 
All of these differences, and most notably the expressive element of 
prediction markets, make the existing SEC framework an awkward fit for 
prediction markets.  Moving from this discussion of securities regulation, 
we turn to yet another regulatory framework that might lend useful in-
sights, the framework governing commodities and futures trading. 
C. Commodities Trading 
Before wading into the argument over the propriety of regulating 
prediction markets through the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), we first provide a brief overview of what commodities are, 
the purpose of commodities trading, how commodities trading has his-
 
 173. A system of integrated disclosure is mandated by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 174. See Cherry & Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices, supra note 45, at 1164–67 (describing methods 
of prediction market design that could reduce the potential for insider trading and market manipula-
tion). 
 175. Indeed, the socially conscious investing movement is growing in popularity.  See, e.g., Maria 
O’Brien Hylton, “Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient 
Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1992); Andrew Leckey, Conscience Investors Can Still Cash In: Socially 
Screened Funds Gain Assets, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2006, § 5, at 5 (explaining the growing appeal of so-
cially conscious investing, especially after Enron and other corporate scandals). 
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torically been regulated, and how the CFTC has recently reached out to 
regulate prediction markets. 
Commodities and futures trading primarily exist for the purpose of 
hedging risks.176  The clearest and easiest example would be a futures 
contract for wheat.  A wheat farmer would be concerned if he or she 
thought that the price of wheat would decline in the next year.  On the 
other hand, a cereal-making company would be worried if they thought 
the price of wheat would increase in the next year.  Commodities mar-
kets would allow either the farmer or the cereal maker to “lock in” a cer-
tain price at a future date.  Through such “lock-ins,” farmers and cereal 
makers can protect themselves from market declines or increases.177  De-
rivatives are a general term for investments that are often grouped with 
commodities and futures.  In a contract for a derivative, the price de-
pends on the action of another financial instrument.178 
Beginning in the late 1800s and early 1900s, states began forbidding 
futures trading conducted in storefronts commonly known as “bucket-
shops.”179  As noted by other commentators, the trading that occurred in 
these bucketshops often resembled gambling, as do many modern-day 
commodity trades.180  The modern regulatory approach that has largely 
been adopted has been the channeling of trading through exchanges ap-
proved by the CFTC, the administrative agency charged with oversight 
of commodities trading.181  In 2000, Congress passed a bill that effectively 
deregulated many areas of commodities trading.182  Another significant 
event in the industry occurred at the end of 2006 when the two leading 
commodities trading floors, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the 
Chicago Board of Trade merged, turned the city of Chicago into a clear-
inghouse for commodities and futures transactions.183 
In terms of the interaction of the commodities laws and prediction 
markets, in 2005, in an event significant for a number of reasons, the 
CFTC asserted jurisdiction over a prediction market.  On October 4, 
2005, the CFTC assessed a penalty against Tradesports,184 an Irish com-
 
 176. The example is based on one provided in Hazen, supra note 119, at 378. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Niall Ferguson, Trading on Commodities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2006, at A16. 
 179. Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of Derivative 
Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 11 n.32 (1994) (describing origins of term “bucket-
shop”). 
 180. See Hurt, supra note 3, at 396. 
 181. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Mar-
ket for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 721–22 (1999) (describing origins of commodities and de-
rivatives regulation). 
 182. Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codi-
fied as amended at 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.). 
 183. David Roeder, A Frenzy for Futures, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at 43, 47 (“[I]n 2006, the 
Merc and the Board of Trade shook hands on a merger they hope to complete by the middle of this 
year.  The $8 billion deal, which longtime Merc leader Leo Melamed called a Don Quixote impossible 
dream, was made possible by the soaring stock prices of both markets’ parent companies.”). 
 184. http://www.tradesports.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).  The United Kingdom and Ireland do 
not place restrictions on gambling and wagering. 
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pany that runs both prediction markets and sports betting, asserting that 
Tradesports was engaged in unauthorized commodities trading.185  In re-
sponse to the CFTC’s action, Tradesports delisted the offending markets 
that the CFTC identified—Gold Futures, Daily Crude, and U.S. Dollars 
versus Yen—and settled the action for $150,000 in civil monetary penal-
ties.186 
At the same time, the CFTC’s pronouncement is also significant for 
what it did not do.  The Tradesports markets on other subjects—the po-
litical, sports, and current events markets—continued trading without 
agency interference.  From the markets that the CFTC selected, one 
could logically make the argument that the CFTC was only taking action 
against the markets that either duplicated commodities trading or most 
resembled such trading.187  The other markets were not tied to the deliv-
ery, production, or cost of physical goods or objects, but rather, were 
based on knowledge and information about politics or other newsworthy 
areas. 
Meanwhile, among the commentators who have written about pre-
diction markets and how they might be regulated, there is substantial 
disagreement about what role the CFTC should play.  Professor Tom 
Bell, a long-time proponent of prediction markets, suggests that no regu-
lation is currently needed, that exemptions take prediction markets out 
of the jurisdiction of the CFTC, and suggests that existing common-law 
tort and contract remedies may suffice to protect traders.188  Hahn and 
Tetlock of the American Enterprise Institute, on the other hand, suggest 
that CFTC regulation would actually bring more stability and certainty to 
prediction markets, because then, at the very least, these markets would 
not be banned as illegal gambling or subject to criminal sanctions.189  Ar-
chitzel, a long-time lawyer for the CFTC, also suggests that the CFTC 
should have jurisdiction over information markets, again for some of the 
same reasons of regulatory certainty.190 
There is a certain pragmatism to Hahn and Tetlock’s and Archit-
zel’s arguments in favor of CFTC regulation.  Compared to either the 
SEC or gambling enforcers, the CFTC would certainly be the least intru-
sive in terms of regulation.  To some degree, it is a potentially extreme 
position—and perhaps an isolating one—to assume that all market regu-
lation is harmful, especially when the alternative might be a complete 
 
 185. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n Assesses Penalties Against Irish Co. Trade Exch. Network Ltd. for Offering Illegal Commod-
ity Option Contracts (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf05/opa5124-05.htm [here-
inafter CFTC Press Release]. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Bell, Promoting the Progress, supra note 14, at 67–77 (discussing exemptions). 
 189. Hahn & Tetlock, A New Approach, supra note 14, at 272–79. 
 190. Architzel, supra note 14, at 50. 
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ban based on (superficial, yet potentially problematic) similarities be-
tween prediction markets and internet gambling. 
Of course, any proposed regulation must be approached with 
thought and care.  At the present time, prediction markets are still in an 
embryonic stage and the implications of the technology, as well as the 
best way to regulate it, have not been fully evaluated.191  There is enough 
of a surface similarity to futures contracts that prediction markets would 
fit within the CFTC’s bailiwick, at least more so than the other regulatory 
regimes discussed. 
At the same time, we would argue, that if the CFTC is to regulate, 
such regulation must take into account the unique expressive elements of 
prediction markets, which differentiate them from commodities trading.  
Those trading in the commodities markets are doing so in order to hedge 
risk and lower financial exposure and risk, not to express any particular 
opinion on science, politics, world events, or other matters of public con-
cern.  In other words, trading on ideas is not the same as trading on 
bushels of wheat, the movement of currency prices, or other fungible 
goods.  This is a distinction with a difference that should be reflected in 
any regulatory structure that might be applied to prediction markets. 
IV. CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT MODELS: AN INAPT FIT 
If regulatory areas such as gambling, securities, and commodities do 
not apply neatly to prediction markets, in part because of the expressive 
qualities of prediction markets, what First Amendment tests might be 
applicable?  In this Part, we analyze the tests applied to expressive con-
duct and commercial speech to see how they might apply to prediction 
markets.  Yet, none of these tests seem to be a particularly good match 
for the reasons discussed below.  This tends to suggest that prediction 
markets can help us clarify and refine our thinking about the way tradi-
tional First Amendment doctrines surrounding expressive conduct and 
commercial speech have been constituted. 
A. Expressive Conduct 
The political topics at issue in prediction markets are not presented 
in traditional forums for political debates such as university classrooms 
or newspaper editorial pages.  Instead, they typically occur on a website, 
and sometimes involve tradable securities with monetary rewards.  Does 
this change the constitutional result? 
 
 191. In a future article we intend to discuss a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of infor-
mation markets, one that will protect the development of this emerging field and at the same time fur-
ther investor confidence.  At this time, however, a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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The Supreme Court held in United States v. O’Brien that “when 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the 
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms.”192  Such speech, called “expressive conduct” or “symbolic 
speech,” receives a balancing test more tolerant of government regula-
tion.193  The O’Brien test holds that for regulation of expressive conduct, 
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.194 
This test is typically applied in contexts that are “content neutral,” mean-
ing that the speech restrictions are justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech.195 
The O’Brien test certainly has critics who have pointed to its ana-
lytical difficulties.196  But taking the Court’s decision on its face, let us 
consider the initial question: if regulation of prediction markets would be 
“content neutral.”  It would depend on the nature of the regulation, of 
course.  A regulation that applied equally to all subjects on a prediction 
market—political and nonpolitical alike—certainly would be content 
neutral.  An example might be a legal restriction against fraud, requiring 
full disclosure of the terms of the contract, and requiring all bidders to 
honor their contracts.  A regulation that restricted only certain topics, 
however, seems more likely to be content based and thus subject to strict 
scrutiny.  One example might be a restriction that attempted to prevent 
people from predicting the outcome of U.S. presidential elections, but 
allowed such predictions for congressional races, local elections, or elec-
tions in foreign countries.  More broadly, a ban on predictions on any 
form of elections—while allowing contracts on other political events, 
such as the success of a Supreme Court nomination—also appears con-
tent based.  And perhaps more broadly, laws that attempt to carve out 
entire areas of thought as impermissible for prediction markets seem to 
have elements of content-based discrimination. 
Assuming regulation of prediction markets is deemed not to be con-
tent based, how might the O’Brien test apply?  It obviously depends on 
 
 192. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 193. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government generally has a freer hand 
in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”). 
 194. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 195. See, e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
 196. See, e.g., James M. McGoldrick, Jr., United States v. O’Brien Revisited: Of Burning Things, 
Waving Things, and G-Strings, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2006) (arguing that the O’Brien test 
should be “buried with finality”).  O’Brien-level scrutiny may also be shifting over time.  See, e.g., 
Susan Dente Ross, Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine: The 1990s [R]evolution of the Central 
Hudson and O’Brien Tests, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 723, 724–25 (2001). 
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the exact regulation at issue, but it still seems possible to discuss the 
types of regulations that would pass muster, as well as the kind that 
might not. 
First, under O’Brien, the regulation must implicate “a sufficiently 
important governmental interest” in regulating “the nonspeech element” 
of the communication.197  Here, the nonspeech element of an information 
market seems not to be (1) the actual choice of topics, which involves 
judgment about which topics are significant and worthy of discussion; (2) 
an individual’s vote on any particular topic, which as discussed previ-
ously, is close to classic political speech; or (3) the aggregated prediction 
of the participants in the prediction market, which represents a collective 
judgment worthy at least of the same degree of political protection as an 
individual’s prediction.198  Rather, nonspeech elements would include the 
mechanics of voting in a prediction market, particularly whether money 
changes hands.  Although some might note that donating money can be a 
form of expression,199 traditional First Amendment doctrine draws a dis-
tinction between expression and commercial activities and allows greater 
regulation of commercial activities.200  We expect this distinction may 
also appear in the regulation of information markets.  Thus, prediction 
markets that entail monetary stakes are more likely candidates for regu-
lation. 
In regulating nonspeech activities, the government under O’Brien 
must also have a “sufficiently compelling governmental interest.”  This is 
likely to be a fact specific inquiry, depending upon the nature of the as-
serted government interest.  Activities such as preventing fraud, requir-
ing the enforcement of contracts,201 preventing crime, protecting national 
security, and avoiding the subversion of other government activities 
might all qualify, depending upon the details of the situation.  In other 
situations, the government interest seems more controversial, for exam-
 
 197. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
 198. To the extent that the collective judgment of the information market is more likely to be cor-
rect (as empirically appears to be true on many occasions), the utilitarian aims of the First Amend-
ment in discovering truth would be served by providing even greater protection to the collective judg-
ment than to the individual predictions.  As a practical matter, the collective expression derives from 
the individual predictions, and so there is a need to protect the individual expressions as well, but it 
seems worth noting that under some policy rationales, the collective judgment represented in an in-
formation market seems to deserve heightened protection because of its increased likelihood of pro-
moting the discovery of truth that the First Amendment at least partially is designed to achieve. 
 199. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 19 (1976). 
 200. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 172. 
 201. As a matter of public policy, life insurance contracts require a degree of closeness to the in-
sured individual to reduce the incentive for someone to take out life insurance on an unrelated person 
and then profit by their death.  Contracts without this insurable interest are void as matter of law, even 
if the insured would consent to the agreement.  See generally Mary Ann Mancini, Trustworthy Insur-
ance?, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at 25. 
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ple, attempting to prevent citizens from criticizing government policy202 
or promoting certain forms of moral behavior.203 
Although courts may be more likely to uphold the regulation of 
prediction markets in areas where money changes hands, it seems 
worthwhile to contemplate why money should matter so much.  In other 
areas, at least, the presence of money does not seem to be of great consti-
tutional significance.  For example, newspapers sell subscriptions, they 
hire people to solicit and edit commentary, and many pay a nominal 
amount to op-ed contributors.  None of this commercial activity places 
the commentary piece into the realm of O’Brien’s level of intermediate 
scrutiny.204  Yet, the incentive structure in a prediction market may more 
effectively achieve First Amendment goals than payment for an op-ed.  
The reason is that, in contrast with the op-ed, the payout for the opinion 
in a prediction market is not guaranteed.  Rather, the speaker receives 
money only if his or her prediction is correct.  Moreover, at least in some 
prediction markets, the speaker profits to the extent that he or she is will-
ing to invest money behind the prediction, so that small monetary in-
vestments—perhaps reflecting uncertainty about a prediction—receive 
small rewards, whereas greater monetary investments, perhaps indicating 
greater confidence, receive greater rewards if correct.  In cases where the 
payout is directly linked to predictive accuracy, such a system seems 
more likely to fulfill the truth-seeking function of the First Amendment.  
Thus, under a utilitarian analysis of the First Amendment, prediction 
markets would merit at least as much (and perhaps even more) protec-
tion as a newspaper op-ed page.  If finding truth is what matters, why 
should our regulatory system not encourage information markets to re-
ward those most adept at predicting the truth about our future? 
B. Commercial Speech 
According to the Supreme Court, “commercial speech” is “expres-
sion related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence.”205  To determine if commercial speech is constitutionally pro-
tected, the Supreme Court has adopted the so-called Central Hudson 
test, which requires that (1) the commercial speech concerns lawful activ-
ity and is not misleading, (2) the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial, (3) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to 
 
 202. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (upholding even inflammatory speech of burning 
American flag). 
 203. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing a liberty interest in homosex-
ual activity); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state statute preventing mar-
ried couples from buying contraceptives). 
 204. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (noting that presence of money did not trigger O’Brien 
test). 
 205. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
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serve that interest.206  In many Supreme Court cases, this definition of 
commercial speech, perhaps predictably, has been applied to commercial 
advertising,207 including advertisements for activities, such as drinking al-
cohol, that some have deemed vices.208 
Although the doctrine certainly has its critics,209 let us take the 
Court’s test on its face and consider if the Court’s definition of commer-
cial speech could apply to prediction markets.  Advertising to promote a 
prediction market might seem to qualify as commercial speech, as it 
would solicit individuals to engage in an activity for their profit and the 
profit of the market organizers.  But the actual votes in a prediction mar-
ket frequently seem to involve expressions that are not solely related to 
one’s economic gain.  This is particularly true in the case of participants 
who consciously vote in the market to support their desired candidates or 
outcomes, even if such votes are not likely to result in monetary gain. 
The fact that one has a financial stake in the result of that prediction 
does not seem to mean that the speech is solely related to one’s financial 
gain, as the Central Hudson test seems to envision.  Rather, the speech is 
a sort of hybrid, part political and part commercial, and it seems unclear 
at best if the Central Hudson test is truly applicable.  Perhaps a good 
analogy for the prediction market participant is again to a newspaper op-
ed columnist.  The columnist engages in pure political speech by writing 
a column yet simultaneously hopes to win a public following by making 
accurate political assessments and thus, presumably, eventually make 
additional money.  Such newspaper columns—and, we think, prediction 
markets as well—seem far closer to the pure political speech than to the 
advertisements that frequently constitute commercial speech addressed 
in cases before the Supreme Court.210 
Nevertheless, if the Central Hudson test was applied to a prediction 
market, what would be the result?  On some level, this question is impos-
 
 206. Id. at 566. 
 207. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco advertising); Greater 
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (broadcast advertising of casino gam-
bling); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (advertising price of alcoholic bever-
ages); cf. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1183–84 (1988) (listing types of commercial speech other than advertising). 
 208. See Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme 
Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 345, 349 (2000) (concluding that the Court is applying greater protection to advertising for 
so-called vices). 
 209. See, e.g., Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment De-
mands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 
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sible to answer in the abstract because the results will depend upon the 
specific structure of the information market at issue and the asserted 
government interest in regulation.  Yet despite this limitation, it is possi-
ble to make some general comments about how the test might apply. 
First, the Central Hudson analysis begins by requiring that the 
commercial speech “concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”211  
Under the traditional commercial speech doctrine, this seems fairly 
straightforward.  The state is free to prohibit advertisements for cocaine, 
for example, because it is an illegal drug, just as it is free to prohibit de-
ceptive advertising practices such as “bait and switch” or false claims that 
a new drug will simultaneously cure cancer, reduce weight, and improve 
one’s sex life.  Notably, these restrictions involve commercial transac-
tions (such as the purchase of a drug) with at least some distance from 
the speech act, as opposed to the purchase of a newspaper or an adver-
tisement. 
In contrast, the act of participating in a prediction market has more 
elements of expression. Consider, for example, a market devoted to pre-
dicting the street price of marijuana, both now and in the future.  On one 
level, this market would undeniably concern unlawful activity, and thus 
arguably fail the first prong of the Central Hudson test; yet it simultane-
ously would be predicting the efficacy of government policy because ef-
fective drug-enforcement efforts tend to raise the street price of illegal 
drugs.  Could such a prediction market be outlawed consistent with the 
First Amendment?  Certainly a general prediction—“I think the street 
price of marijuana will increase ten percent in the coming year”—would 
seem constitutionally protected, and we remain skeptical that the aggre-
gation of this prediction by a prediction market renders it less deserving 
of constitutional protection.  If nothing else, we think the hypothetical 
shows the difficulty of mechanically trying to apply the Central Hudson 
test to prediction markets. 
In any event, the “misleading” part of Central Hudson’s first prong 
seems easier to apply, at least if a situation arose where a topic on a pre-
diction market was somehow misleading enough to constitute a type of 
consumer fraud.  One difficulty, of course, is that, in most cases, a topic 
for prediction that is vague or unclear enough to give rise to complaints 
would be so unclear on its face that participants would seem unlikely to 
place money on an issue that they did not comprehend.  A more realistic 
possibility for regulation might be a prediction market that misled con-
sumers by manipulating the results or the contract, failing to disclose the 
fee system in advance, or otherwise failing to disclose material informa-
tion.  A government would be able to prohibit such activities (either un-
der Congress’s commerce clause authority or a state’s police powers to 
 
 211. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
CHERRY.DOC 3/31/2008  9:45:29 AM 
No. 3] PREDICTION MARKETS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 871 
enact consumer-protection statutes), and the First Amendment should 
pose no bar to such regulatory enforcement. 
Second, the Central Hudson test also requires that the asserted gov-
ernment interest in regulation be “substantial.”  In the context of predic-
tion markets, what might qualify as a substantial government interest?  
The most obvious possibilities are the types of consumer-protection stat-
utes mentioned above; similar federal consumer-protection restrictions 
on speech or data gathering have already occurred on topics ranging 
from enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission to the Do 
Not Call List restrictions on telemarketers to mandatory disclosures on 
drug and food packaging.212 
Beyond consumer protection, the possibility of achieving a “sub-
stantial” government interest appears murkier.  Would saving the gov-
ernment from embarrassment qualify if a prediction market gave predic-
tions that undercut government statements?  Intuitively, we think not, 
and a substantial body of Supreme Court precedent prohibiting view-
point-based discrimination213 would seem to protect unfavorable predic-
tions by an information market.  To establish a substantial government 
interest, some real negative externality, not simply a dislike of the predic-
tion, will probably be necessary. 
Third, the Central Hudson test requires that the regulation must di-
rectly advance the governmental interest asserted.214  Here, again, the 
outcome will be fact specific, depending on how closely does the regula-
tion, as applied to a prediction market, advance the government interest.  
In this context, perhaps the most immediate observation is that analyses 
of governmental interests developed in different areas may not easily ap-
ply to the new field of prediction markets.  For example, as discussed 
above, a key rationale for certain commodities restrictions may be to 
avoid disruptions among commodities traders exchanging large sums of 
money.  Such a regulation, although a legitimate government interest in 
that context, may not be of much use in achieving that same interest 
when applied to an information market.  Likewise, a rationale for pro-
hibiting private lotteries might be to reduce competition to the state-run 
lottery, but we suspect prediction markets would not pose such competi-
tive challenges to a state’s gambling and revenue-raising operations. 
Fourth, under the Central Hudson test, the regulation may not be 
more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest.215  In 
this regard, it seems noteworthy that many of the government rationales 
for regulation of prediction markets occur only because of the presence 
of money.  When money is not involved, however, it is far more difficult 
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to imagine a governmental regulation that might satisfy the Central Hud-
son test.  Thus, at the very least, government regulations ultimately may 
have to carve out exceptions for moneyless information markets.  And 
information markets such as the IEM that involve relatively small 
amounts of money, such as $500, would seem more likely to receive con-
stitutional protection because the types of interests that justify regulation 
when large amounts of money are involved may seem to be overbroad 
when applied to small-scale financial stakes.  In short, although there are 
good reasons to question whether information markets are commercial 
speech, to the extent that they are, the Central Hudson test is still likely 
to impose significant constraints on the ability of government to regulate 
prediction markets, particularly when the markets involve little or no 
real money changing hands. 
In sum, we have concluded that much of the activity that occurs in a 
prediction market is comparable to the type of activity that traditionally 
receives First Amendment protection, in that it encompasses expression 
and furthers truth seeking.216  At the same time, the traditional tests that 
have been developed are not an exact fit for this new technology.  In a 
sense, this points out that First Amendment theory needs to be reconcep-
tualized to accommodate a situation where money is needed in a differ-
ent way to facilitate expression.  Be that as it may, the next question is 
how should the government respond? 
V. SOLUTIONS: BACKING AWAY FROM THE CLASH 
In this section, we explore ways that all three branches of the fed-
eral government might work to reduce and resolve this tension between 
regulation and the Constitution, so that legitimate governmental regula-
tory concerns can be satisfied while still allowing prediction markets to 
do their work.  In doing so, we present a new legal test, adapted from ob-
scenity law, that may prove useful to courts grappling with these issues. 
A. Executive-Branch Action 
In many ways, the executive branch is the least-cost avoider capable 
of preventing any conflict between prediction markets and the First 
Amendment.  Because the executive branch will initiate any enforcement 
action, its discretion and judgment alone may resolve the tensions with-
out any intervention by the legislative and judicial branches.  With regard 
to online gambling restrictions, for example, applicable regulations could 
make clear that prediction markets are not being targeted. 
More broadly, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the De-
partment of Justice and regulatory agencies such as the Commodities Fu-
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tures Trading Commission can help prevent conflicts with protected 
speech.  To date, the record of judgment in this area seems mixed.  On 
the one hand, the CFTC no-action letter to the Iowa Electronic Markets 
seems a sensible recognition that the type of activity occurring when 
people predict the next president is far different from the traditional 
trading of wheat and currency.  Likewise, the CFTC’s apparent limitation 
of the Tradesports enforcement action to contracts involving what ap-
pear to be traditional commodities suggests at least some recognition of 
the statutory limits of authority, although perhaps not of the constitu-
tional limits.  On the other hand, Department of Justice subpoenas di-
rected at commercial banks that had underwritten the initial public offer-
ings of several overseas gambling companies may suggest an overly 
aggressive approach to enforcement,217 particularly if it extends beyond 
traditional gaming activities, such as online poker, to reach the type of 
conduct that contains an expressive, predictive element.  And more gen-
erally, neither the Department of Justice nor the CFTC have made clear 
their intention to respect the type of First Amendment activity incorpo-
rated in most prediction markets. 
As initially discussed above, one solution for the current legal un-
certainty regarding the legal status of prediction markets is for one fed-
eral agency, most likely the CFTC, to become the sole regulator of the 
field.218  Although it remains open to dispute whether such regulation is 
necessary (or even always within the agency’s statutory jurisdiction, de-
pending upon the nature of the prediction market), a clear regulatory 
system would clear up much of the uncertainty.  Moreover, to the extent 
that the regulation respected the First Amendment values involved in the 
prediction markets and preempted other less enlightened interference, 
such governmental involvement could conceivably allow prediction mar-
kets to develop faster than they would in an environment of regulatory 
uncertainty. 
B. Congressional Action 
If the executive branch does not resolve the conflict, congressional 
action offers another way of dealing with the tensions between enforce-
ment actions and constitutionally protected activity.  But this poses spe-
cial problems.  If the executive branch is the least-cost avoider, Congress 
is perhaps the highest-cost avoider.  Any law would require attention 
from a legislative body with many pressing matters on its hands, and it 
seems unclear at best if Congress would devote time to passing legisla-
tion to protect what is at the moment the narrow and specialized area of 
prediction markets.  Worse, at least some members had a negative reac-
tion to a proposed information market that was deemed (rightly or 
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wrongly) as allowing bets on terrorism,219 and these negative legislative 
views, even if unwarranted, may present a substantial barrier to finding 
the consensus to protect information markets.  This may be especially 
true when the protection is being sought, after all, from laws that Con-
gress itself recently passed. 
A legislative solution is not impossible, of course.  The online gam-
bling bill was passed by a Republican Congress partly to satisfy the con-
cerns of social conservatives.220  With a new Democratic majority in both 
houses, the antigambling lobby may have less influence, and there may 
be a willingness to modify what might be perceived as the excess of a 
prior legislature.  Yet this possibility seems uncertain at best, and at this 
point, there is little-to-no evidence that such legislation is imminent. 
Nevertheless, if Congress were to pass legislation to protect predic-
tion markets, what should it look like?  Professor Tom Bell has proposed 
a draft bill that would protect prediction markets that address scientific 
developments.221  We certainly think that congressional protection of 
prediction markets would be a positive development.  But we note that if 
Congress is going to invest the time and attention to protect prediction 
markets, it may be unlikely to do so for this narrow field more than once.  
Consequently, it is important that any protective legislation cover the 
bulk of existing markets containing constitutionally protected speech, 
and it is also important that such protective legislation be broad enough 
to allow prediction markets to flourish as broadly as possible.  Unfortu-
nately, Bell’s proposed legislation protects only scientific predictions—
not those involving other important areas such as law, politics, culture, 
and economics that also enjoy constitutional protection.222  These are 
valuable areas in which prediction markets can develop, and predictions 
in these areas also involve elements of free speech.  They also deserve 
protection, along with scientific speech, and thus any protective legisla-
tion should sweep more broadly than Bell’s proposed bill. 
Congressional legislation covering prediction markets with broad 
protection against prosecution and governmental interference might pro-
vide significant political advantages.  The United States would have a 
regulatory regime for prediction markets more comparable to the free-
dom present in many other nations, which would keep the United States 
from being burdened by a competitive disadvantage in the development 
of this new predictive technology.  Keeping prediction markets based in 
the United States may even ultimately aid regulatory efforts because, if 
markets are driven to more hospitable environments in Europe or Asia, 
U.S. authorities will suffer diminished control over a technology that has 
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much of its origins in this nation. If Congress looks, it will find many rea-
sons that prediction markets should be promoted, not stifled. 
C. Judicial Action 
If the executive branch is the least-cost avoider and the legislative 
branch is the greatest-cost avoider, the judicial branch may be the least-
likely avoider.  By that, we mean that ultimately courts probably will 
have to resolve the constitutional challenge.  Before that legal clash oc-
curs, it will be helpful for legal scholarship to begin analyzing the issues 
that courts will face and how judges might successfully resolve them. 
The task will likely prove to be novel.  As discussed above, none of 
the most common classifications of speech seem a perfect match for this 
new system of collaborative information gathering.  But we think that, 
surprisingly, legal guidance can be found from an unexpected source—
obscenity law.  At first glance, the fields may seem dissimilar, if only be-
cause pornography and prediction markets appeal to very different in-
terests.  But because prediction markets and gambling are often lumped 
together (and gambling, for good or ill, has traditionally been associated 
with vice), some of the tests developed in connection with another vice 
may potentially be useful.  Perhaps the way the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed sexually offensive material intermixed with constitutionally pro-
tected expression might offer guidance for dealing with expression that is 
intermixed with what some might view as gambling. 
The key legal test for regulating obscenity is set forth in Miller v. 
California.223 
Here, the Supreme Court concluded that 
[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.224 
How might such a test appear if translated into the field of predic-
tion markets?  An analogous test might ask 
(a) whether the average person would find that the activity, taken as 
a whole, appeals primarily to an interest in gambling for profit; 
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(b) whether the activity violates conduct specifically outlawed by 
state or federal law; and 
(c) whether the activity, taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic, po-
litical, economic, or scientific value. 
Obviously this test requires definition and application by the courts, just 
as the task of trying to apply the Miller test has resulted in no shortage of 
litigation.225  Nevertheless, the importance of the First Amendment inter-
ests at stake may make such judicial intervention inescapable, just as it 
was in the case of obscene and pornographic images (a form of speech 
that arguably lacks the significant social value that can be obtained from 
prediction markets).  And given the difficulty in applying other First 
Amendment categories to this new technology, we think that the Miller 
test offers a useful analogy for discussion. 
How might this test work in practice?  As one of the harder cases 
(at least compared to a play-money or university-sponsored prediction 
market), let us consider the application of the test to a prediction market 
(1) that uses real money to purchase tradable securities, (2) that is run by 
a for-profit institution and not an academic institution, and (3) that in-
volves trading predictions about political events such as who will win the 
2008 presidential election or whether the Supreme Court will strike down 
state-sponsored affirmative action. 
This test’s first prong, requiring that the activity taken as a whole 
appeals primarily to an interest in gambling for profit, is at least partially 
satisfied by the profit motive of both the participants and the organizers.  
Unlike the many prediction markets that use play money, this type of 
market can find no easy escape by its noncommercial nature.  The re-
maining question is if these sorts of activities—predicting the outcome of 
presidential elections and Supreme Court rulings, for example—
constitute “gambling.”  On the one hand, the activity consists in placing a 
monetary wager on the outcome of events not within one’s control, ar-
guably analogous to placing a bet on which football team will win the 
Super Bowl next year.  On the other hand, the outcome does not depend 
on chance, as much casino gambling does, and the expressive elements of 
political speech embodied in the topics should, by this point, be clear. 
But let us concede for purposes of this hypothetical that the activity 
in the prediction market constitutes “gambling.”  As indicated above, we 
think that if a court were to balance the harms of the activity against the 
advantages of the type of political speech at issue, the balancing test 
would overwhelmingly favor constitutional protection.  Yet these sorts of 
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balancing tests are frequently, and perhaps inevitably, subjective,226 and 
they may not provide the sort of legal predictability that appears impor-
tant for the development of information markets.  If a Miller-type test 
could prevent this uncertainty, it might overall be best for the informa-
tion markets, even if their predictive activities are labeled with the taw-
dry-sounding description of gambling.  So, let us assume that a court will 
deem the prediction to be gambling and then continue on with the consti-
tutional analysis. 
This test’s second prong, which requires activity that violates con-
duct specifically outlawed by state or federal law, might indeed be satis-
fied, either under current law (as discussed above) or by future, more 
stringent legislation.  Granted, as discussed above, it does not appear at 
this point that the legislation directed at gambling necessarily targeted 
information markets, and particularly given the expressive elements pre-
sent in prediction markets, courts might well wish to wait until the will of 
the legislature or executive-branch administrative agencies are more 
clearly expressed.  But let us assume that an intention to restrict or ban 
prediction markets did exist.  What then? 
This test’s third prong, perhaps in practice the most important, is 
whether the information market, taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic, 
political, economic, or scientific value.  We think this prong will be ex-
tremely difficult to satisfy for any prediction market that predominantly 
focuses on political, economic, cultural, or scientific topics.  Efforts to 
predict future outcomes of important questions, such as elections, Su-
preme Court decisions, or scientific discoveries, seem to have inherent 
value, even if ultimately unsuccessful.  And if these predictions from in-
formation markets prove accurate, as they frequently have in the past, 
then the value of the market seems even more evident. 
What activities might fail this third prong?  We think the prime 
candidate might be games of pure chance, such as casino-type slot ma-
chines, because the purely recreational value of such activities is unlikely 
to outweigh a state or federal legislative interest in restricting such activi-
ties under a constitutional analysis.227  Likewise, although the matter is 
perhaps less certain, we would not be surprised to see courts conclude 
that predictions on sporting events lack the societal value to justify over-
riding legislation on constitutional grounds.  Admittedly, sports predic-
tion can certainly be an activity of skill, in that sense it is qualitatively dif-
ferent than the spin of a roulette wheel determined by pure chance.228  
Nevertheless, to the extent that government authorities wish to restrict or 
eliminate such activities, we do not think that sports predictions posses 
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such evident social value that courts would be willing to grant sports 
forecasts constitutional protection instead of deferring to the legislative 
branches. 
So what result from this regulatory regime?  The answer, we think, 
is that the prediction markets on most academic subjects—politics, eco-
nomics, and science—would be constitutionally protected, whereas pre-
diction markets on entertainment and sports would be left to the mercies 
of the political branches.  Is this ideal?  The answer partly depends on 
the reader’s political desires, of course.  We personally might wish that 
anything even remotely resembling a prediction market be free to thrive, 
in order that this important field might enjoy the optimal conditions for 
growth.  But the result of this regulatory regime at least presents a sort of 
compromise that would protect the most crucial aspects of prediction 
markets, while permitting government regulation in areas with arguably 
less social value.  Even if this result does not completely satisfy either 
government regulators or those seeking to protect all prediction markets, 
it strikes us at least as a reasonable compromise that will allow (many, if 
not most) prediction markets to develop with greater legal certainty. 
Given the importance of prediction markets and the need to preserve 
their development, we think that even this compromise result is well 
worth achieving. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prediction markets offer the potential to shape the way that we col-
lect knowledge and understand future events.  In an earlier survey of in-
formation markets and discussions with market founders, we docu-
mented government regulation as one factor that was inhibiting the 
growth of this field.229  Since then, especially with the October 2006 gam-
bling legislation, the regulatory atmosphere has arguably worsened. 
Because of the expressive interests at stake in a prediction market, 
we argue that this regulatory zeal is not only misplaced, but potentially 
unconstitutional.  Participating in an information market involves sharing 
one’s knowledge, skills, and insights with the rest of the market.  Such 
expression is constitutionally protected, just as writing a predictive opin-
ion article in the newspaper or giving one’s views to a pollster is pro-
tected.  The mere addition of money (either real or virtual) into the 
equation should not change the constitutional conclusion, particularly 
when there seem to be few negative externalities. 
Although some amount of sensible regulation may be in order to 
protect the participants, the wholesale outlawing of prediction markets 
through a mistaken analogy to gambling should be rejected.  Prediction 
markets offer significant potential for a glimpse into our future, and we 
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need this knowledge.  The law should allow this new Cassandra the 
chance to speak. 
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